Beware of Popular Kids Bearing Gifts: A Framed Field Experiment
The literature on pro-social behavior shows that older children are more generous than younger children; however, the level of individual generosity is heterogeneous even between children of the same age. This paper investigates whether a childâ€™s popularity affects a childâ€™s generosity. Our participants â€“ 231 children, six to twelve years old â€“ decide how many of their four colored wristbands they want to share with another anonymous child. We manipulate the visibility of this decision: in treatment Public, the decisions are revealed to the entire class at the end of the game, whereas in treatment Private childrenâ€™s decisions remain secret. In addition, we elicited each childâ€™s network of friends using an innovative â€œseating mapâ€ mechanism. Our results reveal that more popular children are more generous in Public than Private decision environments, while less popular children behave similarly in both cases. Moreover, older children in Public display greater generosity than (i) older children in Private and (ii) younger children in either Public or Private. Finally, in Public, older and more popular children share more than less popular older children, and more than younger children regardless of popularity; whereas, in Private there is no effect of popularity on children of any age. Length: 34
|Date of creation:||Feb 2014|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 4400 University Drive, MSN 1B2, Fairfax, VA 22030|
Web page: http://ices.gmu.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klaus Abbink & David Masclet & Matthijs van Veelen, 2009.
"Reference point effects in antisocial preferences,"
Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS)
09-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Kovarik, Jaromir & Jiménez, Natalia & Ponti, Giovanni & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Brañas Garza, Pablo & Cobo Reyes, Ramón, 2009.
"Altruism and Social Integration,"
DFAEII Working Papers
2009-35, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Brañas Garza, Pablo & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Cobo Reyes, Ramón & Jiménez, Natalia & Ponti, Giovanni, 2006.
"Altruism in the (Social) Network,"
DFAEII Working Papers
2006-04, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Charness, Gary & Rigotti, Luca & Rustichini, Aldo, 2003. "They are watching you: Social facilitation in institutions," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt37k9n337, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- repec:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:63-64:p:03 is not listed on IDEAS
- Zizzo, Daniel John, 2003. "Money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 263-266, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1045. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stan Tsirulnikov)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.