Emotion Expression and Fairness in Economic Exchange
Research in economics and psychology has established that informal sanctions,particularly expressions of negative emotion, can enforce fair economic exchange. However, scholars are only beginning to understand the reasons informal sanctions affect economic outcomes. Here we provide direct empirical evidence that a preference to avoid negative emotion expression plays an important role in promoting fair exchange. We study one-shot Dictator games, where one subject has the right to determine a division of an amount of money between herself and her receiver. In relation to the standard game, there are significantly less profit-maximizing offers when receivers can react to offers with ex post written messages. Our data provide new perspectives on roles communication systems play in promoting economic efficiency in social environments, and support economic theories of decision that incorporate psychological factors such as guilt and self-deception.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2007|
|Date of revision:||Nov 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 3330 Washington Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201|
Web page: http://ices.gmu.edu/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Matthew Gentzkow, 2006. "Television and Voter Turnout," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(3), pages 931-972.
- Abdul Ghafar Noury & Tom Coupé, 2004.
"Choosing not to choose: on the link between information and abstention,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/7756, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Coupe, Tom & Noury, Abdul G., 2004. "Choosing not to choose: on the link between information and abstention," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 261-265, August.
- Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2006.
"Selling Favors in the Lab: Experiments on Campaign Finance Reform,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1727, CESifo Group Munich.
- Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2008. "Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 215-239, July.
- Richard J. Cebula, 2007. "Influences on the Voter Participation Rate," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 399-412, 04.
- Marco Battaglini & Rebecca B. Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2008. "Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 194-200, May.
- David Dreyer Lassen, 2004. "The Effect of Information on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," EPRU Working Paper Series 04-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Abdul Noury, 2004. "Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European Parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 179-211, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stan Tsirulnikov)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.