IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fup/wpaper/0058.html

Efficiency Wage and Labor Discipline Models: Matched-Panel Evidence from Brazilian Construction Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Luiz A. Esteves

    (Department of Economics, Universidade Federal do Paraná)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to test the relationship between wage and workers’ labor effort for the Brazilian construction industry. This relationship is stated by both the shirking and the labor discipline versions of efficiency wage models. Actually workers’ labor effort is neither verifiable nor available for empirical tests, so the most of the empirical tests for this theory are performed by testing the trade-off between wages and supervision, and the trade-off between wages and the workers’ probability of termination. This paper provides empirical tests for both relationships, and the efficiency wage model hypothesis is empirically supported by this paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Luiz A. Esteves, 2007. "Efficiency Wage and Labor Discipline Models: Matched-Panel Evidence from Brazilian Construction Industry," Working Papers 0058, Universidade Federal do Paraná, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fup:wpaper:0058
    Note: Creation Date corresponds to the year in which the paper was published on the Department of Economics website. The paper may have been written a small number of months before its publication date.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.economiaetecnologia.ufpr.br/textos_discussao/texto_para_discussao_ano_2007_texto_06.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy,Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 376-414, July.
    2. Brown, Charles & Medoff, James, 1989. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1027-1059, October.
    3. Rebitzer, James B., 1995. "Is there a trade-off between supervision and wages? An empirical test of efficiency wage theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 107-129, September.
    4. Sarah Brown & John G. Sessions, 2002. "Wages, Supervision and Sharing:An Analysis of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey," Discussion Papers in Economics 02/7, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    5. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Katarzyna Budnik, 2012. "Do those who stay work less? On the impact of emigration on the measured TFP in Poland," NBP Working Papers 113, Narodowy Bank Polski.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sessions, John G., 2008. "Wages, supervision and sharing," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 653-672, November.
    2. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Simon Adrian Board, 2011. "Relational Contracts and On-the-Job Search," 2011 Meeting Papers 1204, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Drolet, Marie & Morissette, Rene, 1998. "Recent Canadian Evidence on Job Quality by Firm Size," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 1998128e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
    4. de Groot, H.L.F. & van Schaik, A.B.T.M., 1997. "Unemployment and catching up : Europe vis à vis the USA," Other publications TiSEM da7dcf42-9007-43df-a948-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. John G. Sessions & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2014. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," Research in Labor Economics, in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 105-162, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    6. Jonas Agell, 2004. "Why are Small Firms Different? Managers’ Views," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 437-452, October.
    7. Ourania Karakosta & Nikos Tsakiris, 2009. "Indirect Tax Reforms and Public Goods under Imperfect Competition," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    8. Davis, Donald R. & Harrigan, James, 2011. "Good jobs, bad jobs, and trade liberalization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 26-36, May.
    9. Takako Fujiwara‐Greve & Henrich R. Greve, 2004. "The Role of Expectation on Job Search and the Firm Size Effect on Wages," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 56-85, March.
    10. William T. Dickens & Lawrence F. Katz & Kevin Lang & Lawrence H. Summers, 1987. "Employee Crime, Monitoring, and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis," NBER Working Papers 2356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Bradley T. Ewing & James E. Payne, 1999. "The Trade‐Off Between Supervision and Wages: Evidence of Efficiency Wages from the NLSY," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(2), pages 424-432, October.
    12. Andreas Georgiadis, 2013. "Efficiency Wages and the Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage: Evidence from a Low-Wage Labour Market," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 75(6), pages 962-979, December.
    13. Måns Söderbom & Francis Teal & Anthony Wambugu, 2002. "Does firm size really affect earnings?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-08, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    14. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 1995. "The consequences of minimum wage laws Some new theoretical ideas," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 245-255, February.
    15. Yanay Farja & Ori Zax, 2020. "Efficiency Wages with Endogenous Monitoring," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 248-261.
    16. Mahmood Araï & Gérard Ballot & Ali Skalli, 1996. "Différentiels intersectoriels de salaire et caractéristiques des employeurs en France," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 299(1), pages 37-58.
    17. Anne Perrot & André Zylberberg, 1989. "Salaire d'efficience et dualisme du marché du travail," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(1), pages 5-20.
    18. Harvey S. James Jr, 2000. "Separating contract from governance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(2), pages 47-61.
    19. Francois, Patrick & van Ours, Jan C., 2000. "Gender Wage Differentials in a Competitive Labor Market: The Household Interaction Effect," IZA Discussion Papers 202, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Pierre Brochu & Till Gross & Christopher Worswick, 2020. "Temporary foreign workers and firms: Theory and Canadian evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 871-915, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fup:wpaper:0058. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Luciano Nakabashi The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Luciano Nakabashi to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deufpbr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.