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Adverse Selection In Credit Markets And Infant Industry Protection

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  • FLAM, H.
  • STAIGER, R.W.

Abstract

This paper considers the role for infant industry protection when credit markets suffer from adverse risk selection. We show that asymmetric information about firm-specific risk leads to under-funding of the infant industry in a competitive credit market. A small amount of infant industry protection is shown to be welfare improving, and the optimal infant industry tariff is derived. Finally, an alternative government policy of production subsidies is considered under the assumption that the government shares private knowledge with infant industry firms. We argue that a tariff may dominate production subsidies as an entry promoting devise in this context.
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Suggested Citation

  • Flam, H. & Staiger, R.W., 1989. "Adverse Selection In Credit Markets And Infant Industry Protection," Papers 432, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:432
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baldwin, Robert E, 1969. "The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(3), pages 295-305, May/June.
    2. Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November.
    3. Staiger, Robert W. & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "Rules and discretion in trade policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1265-1277, July.
    4. Jaffee, Dwight & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1990. "Credit rationing," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 16, pages 837-888, Elsevier.
    5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    6. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    7. Hellmuth Milde & John G. Riley, 1988. "Signaling in Credit Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 101-129.
    8. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 229-264.
    9. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roland Hodler, 2008. "Specialization and Welfare in the Presence of Imperfectly Integrated Capital Markets and Learning-by-doing," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 391-402, July.
    2. Asilis, Carlos & Richardson, Carlos, 1994. "Infant industry policy and information revelation," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 9(2), pages 209-236.
    3. Baldwin, Robert E, 1992. "Are Economists' Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 804-829, June.
    4. Bin Xu, 2003. "Trade and financial liberalization with asymmetric information in bank financing," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 57-69.

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