Minimum Cost Connection Networks: Truth-telling and Implementation
In the present paper we consider the allocation of cost in connection networks. Agents have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to be connected. Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs of networks satisfying all connection demands. We use three axioms to characterize allocation rules that truthfully implement cost minimizing networks satisfying all connection demands in a game where: (1) a central planner announces an allocation rule and a cost estimation rule; (2) every agent reports her own connection demand as well as all connection costs; and, (3) the central planner selects a cost minimizing network satisfying reported connection demands based on estimated connection costs and allocates true connection costs of the selected network.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.ifro.ku.dk/english/|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tvede, Mich, 2012. "Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 222(3), pages 566-570.
- Rajnish Kumar & Ruben Juarez, .
"Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks,"
Departmental Working Papers
2011-03, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
- Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2013. "Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 359-403, October.
- Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2010. "Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks," Working Papers 201022, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2012. "Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks," Working Papers 201203, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Tijs, Stef & Branzei, Rodica & Moretti, Stefano & Norde, Henk, 2006.
"Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 175(1), pages 121-134, November.
- Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Moretti, S. & Norde, H.W., 2004. "Obligation Rules for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Situations and their Monotonicity Properties," Discussion Paper 2004-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: Beyond the Folk solution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 238-248, July.
- Gustavo Bergantiños & Leticia Lorenzo, 2004. "A non-cooperative approach to the cost spanning tree problem," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 393-403, 07.
- Bergantiños, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 201(3), pages 811-820, March.
- Moulin, Hervé, 2014. "Pricing traffic in a spanning network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 475-490.
- repec:spr:compst:v:59:y:2004:i:3:p:393-403 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:foi:msapwp:03_2013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Geir Tveit)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.