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Minimum Cost Connection Networks: Truth-telling and Implementation

Author

Listed:
  • Jens Leth Hougaard

    (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Mich Tvede

    (Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University)

Abstract

In the present paper we consider the allocation of cost in connection networks. Agents have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to be connected. Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs of networks satisfying all connection demands. We use three axioms to characterize allocation rules that truthfully implement cost minimizing networks satisfying all connection demands in a game where: (1) a central planner announces an allocation rule and a cost estimation rule; (2) every agent reports her own connection demand as well as all connection costs; and, (3) the central planner selects a cost minimizing network satisfying reported connection demands based on estimated connection costs and allocates true connection costs of the selected network.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2013. "Minimum Cost Connection Networks: Truth-telling and Implementation," MSAP Working Paper Series 03_2013, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:foi:msapwp:03_2013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tvede, Mich, 2012. "Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 222(3), pages 566-570.
    2. Gustavo Bergantiños & Leticia Lorenzo, 2004. "A non-cooperative approach to the cost spanning tree problem," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 59(3), pages 393-403, July.
    3. Nimrod Megiddo, 1978. "Computational Complexity of the Game Theory Approach to Cost Allocation for a Tree," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 3(3), pages 189-196, August.
    4. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 201(3), pages 811-820, March.
    5. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: Beyond the Folk solution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 238-248, July.
    6. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-477, March.
    7. Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2013. "Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 359-403, October.
    8. Moulin, Hervé, 2014. "Pricing traffic in a spanning network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 475-490.
    9. Tijs, Stef & Branzei, Rodica & Moretti, Stefano & Norde, Henk, 2006. "Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 175(1), pages 121-134, November.
    10. Gustavo Bergantiños & Leticia Lorenzo, 2005. "Optimal Equilibria in the Non-Cooperative Game Associated with Cost Spanning Tree Problems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 101-115, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ruben Juarez & Michael Wu, 2019. "Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18, April.
    2. Han, Lining & Juarez, Ruben, 2018. "Free intermediation in resource transmission," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 75-84.
    3. Norde, Henk, 2019. "The degree and cost adjusted folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 734-742.
    4. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020. "Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper 2020/06, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    5. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Tvede, Mich & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 98-110.
    6. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tvede, Mich, 2022. "Trouble comes in threes: Core stability in minimum cost connection networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(1), pages 319-324.
    7. Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2018. "Sharing sequential values in a network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 734-779.
    8. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020. "Trouble Comes in Threes: Core stability in Minimum Cost Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper 2020/07, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    9. Jens Leth Hougaard & Hervé Moulin, 2018. "Sharing the cost of risky projects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 663-679, May.
    10. Ruben Juarez & Kohei Nitta & Miguel Vargas, 2020. "Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 817-846, October.
    11. Kristal K. Trejo & Ruben Juarez & Julio B. Clempner & Alexander S. Poznyak, 2023. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining with Unsophisticated Agents," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 937-974, March.
    12. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Kronborg, Dorte & Smilgins, Aleksandrs, 2017. "Fair division of costs in green energy markets," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 220-230.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    axiomatic characterization; connection networks; cost sharing; implementation; truth-telling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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