Additivity in minimum cost spanning tree problems
We characterize a rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems using an additivity property and some basic properties. If the set of possible agents has at least three agents, these basic properties are symmetry and separability. If the set of possible agents has two agents, we must add positivity.
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Game Theory and Information
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