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Organizational complexity and balance sheet management in global banks

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Abstract

Banks have progressively evolved from being standalone institutions to being subsidiaries of increasingly complex financial conglomerates. We conjecture and provide evidence that the organizational complexity of the family of a bank is a fundamental driver of the business model of the bank itself, as reflected in the management of the bank’s own balance sheet. Using micro-data on global banks with branch operations in the United States, we show that branches of conglomerates in more complex families have a markedly lower lending sensitivity to funding shocks. The balance sheet management strategies of banks are very much determined by the structure of the organizations the banks belong to. The complexity of the conglomerate can change the scale of the lending channel for a large global bank by more than 30 percent.

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  • Cetorelli, Nicola & Goldberg, Linda S., 2016. "Organizational complexity and balance sheet management in global banks," Staff Reports 772, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:772
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    1. Nicola Cetorelli & Linda S. Goldberg, 2012. "Follow the Money: Quantifying Domestic Effects of Foreign Bank Shocks in the Great Recession," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 213-218, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Krause, Thomas & Sondershaus, Talina & Tonzer, Lena, 2017. "Complexity and bank risk during the financial crisis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 118-121.
    2. Krause, Thomas & Sondershaus, Talina & Tonzer, Lena, 2016. "The Role of Complexity for Bank Risk during the Financial Crisis: Evidence from a Novel Dataset," IWH Discussion Papers 17/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    global bank; liquidity; transmission; internal capital market; organization; complexity;

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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