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The contribution of on-site examination ratings to an emprircal model of bank failures

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Abstract

This paper investigates how well regulator examinations predict bank failures, and how best to incorporate examination information into an econometric model of time-to-failure. We estimate proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates and find that examiner ratings help explain the failure hazard. Both the overall rating of a bank's condition and management, i.e., the composite CAMELS rating, and ratings of specific components contain information. In addition, we find that the marginal \"effect\" of ratings is non-linear, in that the impact of a rating downgrade on the probability of failure is larger, the weaker a bank's initial rating.

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  • David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, 1999. "The contribution of on-site examination ratings to an emprircal model of bank failures," Working Papers 1999-023, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:1999-023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Berger, Allen N & Davies, Sally M & Flannery, Mark J, 2000. "Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 641-667, August.
    2. James B. Thomson & Gary Whalen, 1988. "Using financial data to identify changes in bank condition," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 24(Q II), pages 17-26.
    3. Allen Berger & Sally Davies, 1998. "The Information Content of Bank Examinations," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 14(2), pages 117-144, October.
    4. Robert DeYoung, 1998. "Management Quality and X-Inefficiency in National Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 13(1), pages 5-22, February.
    5. Rebel A. Cole & Jeffery W. Gunther, 1995. "FIMS: a new monitoring system for banking institutions," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Jan, pages 1-15.
    6. R. Alton Gilbert, 1993. "Implications of annual examinations for the Bank Insurance Fund," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 35-52.
    7. Jones, David S. & King, Kathleen Kuester, 1995. "The implementation of prompt corrective action: An assessment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 491-510, June.
    8. David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, 2000. "Why do Banks Disappear? The Determinants of U.S. Bank Failures and Acquisitions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 127-138, February.
    9. Flannery, Mark J & Houston, Joel F, 1999. "The Value of a Government Monitor for U.S. Banking Firms," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(1), pages 14-34, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wheelock, David C. & Wilson, Paul W., 2004. "Consolidation in US banking: Which banks engage in mergers?," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1-2), pages 7-39.
    2. Thomas B. King & Daniel A. Nuxoll & Timothy J. Yeager, 2006. "Are the causes of bank distress changing? can researchers keep up?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 88(Jan), pages 57-80.

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    Keywords

    Bank failures; Bank examination;

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