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A CAMEL rating's shelf life

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  • Cole, Rebel A.
  • Gunther, Jeffery W.

Abstract

How quickly do the CAMEL ratings regulators assign to banks during on-site examinations become "stale"? One measure of the information content of CAMEL ratings is their ability to discriminate between banks that will fail and those that will survive. To assess the accuracy of CAMEL ratings in predicting failure, Rebel Cole and Jeffery Gunther use as a benchmark an offsite monitoring system based on publicly available accounting data. Their findings suggest that, if a bank has not been examined for more than two quarters, off-site monitoring systems usually provide a more accurate indication of survivability than its CAMEL rating. The lower predictive accuracy for CAMEL ratings “older” than two quarters causes the overall accuracy of CAMEL ratings to fall substantially below that of off-site monitoring systems. The higher predictive accuracy of off-site systems derives from both their timeliness—an updated off-site rating is available for every bank in every quarter—and the accuracy of the financial data on which they are based. Cole and Gunther conclude that off-site monitoring systems should continue to play a prominent role in the supervisory process, as a complement to on-site examinations.

Suggested Citation

  • Cole, Rebel A. & Gunther, Jeffery W., 1995. "A CAMEL rating's shelf life," MPRA Paper 24693, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Nov 2008.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24693
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. Alton Gilbert, 1993. "Implications of annual examinations for the Bank Insurance Fund," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 35-52.
    2. Allen Berger & Sally Davies, 1998. "The Information Content of Bank Examinations," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 14(2), pages 117-144, October.
    3. Jones, David S. & King, Kathleen Kuester, 1995. "The implementation of prompt corrective action: An assessment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 491-510, June.
    4. Rebel A. Cole & Jeffery W. Gunther, 1995. "FIMS: a new monitoring system for banking institutions," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Jan, pages 1-15.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Fuad Aleskerov & V. Belousova & M. Serdyuk & V. Solodkov, 2008. "Dynamic Analysis of the Behavioural Patterns of the Largest Commercial Banks in the Russian Federation," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 12-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank; bank failure; CAMEL; CAMEL rating; commercial bank; offsite supervision;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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