Did FDICIA enhance market discipline on community banks? a look at evidence from the jumbo-CD market
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) directed the FDIC to resolve bank failures in the least costly manner, shifting more of the failure-resolution burden to jumbo-CD holders. We examine the sensitivity of jumbo-CD yields and runoffs to failure risk before and after FDICIA. We also examine the economic significance of estimated risk sensitivities before and after the Act, looking at the implied impact of risk on bank funding costs and profits. The evidence indicates that yields and runoff were sensitive to risk before and after FDICIA, but that this sensitivity, which was always economically small, did not differ significantly across the two sample periods. We conclude that, despite FDICIA, the jumbo-CD market puts little pressure on banks to contain risk. This finding weakens the case for market discipline as a reliable pillar of bank supervision.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2002|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166|
Web page: http://www.stlouisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Flannery, Mark J, 1986. " Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(1), pages 19-37, March.
- Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 1996.
"Will legislated early intervention prevent the next banking crisis?,"
96-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 1996. "Will Legislated Early Intervention Prevent the Next Banking Crisis?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 359, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991.
"Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1989. "Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: evidence from Japanese industrial groups," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 82, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-364, August.
- Berger, Allen N & Hannan, Timothy H, 1989.
"The Price-Concentration Relationship in Banking,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 71(2), pages 291-299, May.
- Cosimano, Thomas F. & McDonald, Bill, 1998. "What's different among banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 57-70, February.
- María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002.
"Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises,"
Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,
in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174
Central Bank of Chile.
- Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2001. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 1029-1051, 06.
- Rebel A. Cole & Jeffery W. Gunther, 1995. "FIMS: a new monitoring system for banking institutions," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Jan, pages 1-15.
- Crabbe, Leland & Post, Mitchell A, 1994. " The Effect of a Rating Downgrade on Outstanding Commercial Paper," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 39-56, March.
- George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1998. "Deposit insurance reform in the FDIC Improvement Act: the experience to date," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 2-20.
- Flannery, Mark J & Houston, Joel F, 1999. "The Value of a Government Monitor for U.S. Banking Firms," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(1), pages 14-34, February.
- Aggarwal, Raj & Jacques, Kevin T., 2001. "The impact of FDICIA and prompt corrective action on bank capital and risk: Estimates using a simultaneous equations model," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1139-1160, June.
- Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
- James, Christopher, 1988. "The use of loan sales and standby letters of credit by commercial banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 395-422.
- R. Alton Gilbert & Mark D. Vaughan, 2000.
"Do depositors care about enforcement actions?,"
2000-020, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- John S. Jordan, 2000. "Depositor discipline at failing banks," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 15-28.
- O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. " Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
- Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 1999. "Do depositors punish banks for"bad"behavior? : market discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2058, The World Bank.
- Cook, Douglas O & Spellman, Lewis J, 1994. "Repudiation Risk and Restitution Costs: Toward Understanding Premiums on Insured Deposits," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 439-459, August.
- Flannery, Mark J, 1982. "Retail Bank Deposits as Quasi-Fixed Factors of Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 527-536, June.
- Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995.
"Bank regulation and the credit crunch,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 679-692, June.
- Rebel Cole & Jeffery Gunther, 1998. "Predicting Bank Failures: A Comparison of On- and Off-Site Monitoring Systems," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 13(2), pages 103-117, April.
- Akhigbe, Aigbe & Whyte, Ann Marie, 2001. "The impact of FDICIA on bank returns and risk: Evidence from the capital markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 393-417, February.
- R. Alton Gilbert, 1992. "The effects of legislating prompt corrective action on the Bank Insurance Fund," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 3-22.
- Herbert L. Baer & Elijah Brewer, 1986. "Uninsured deposits as a source of market discipline: some new evidence," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Sep, pages 23-31.
- R. Alton Gilbert, 1993. "Implications of annual examinations for the Bank Insurance Fund," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 35-52.
- Cannella Jr., Albert A. & Fraser, Donald R. & Lee, D. Scott, 1995. "Firm failure and managerial labor markets Evidence from Texas banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 185-210, June.
- Andrew P. Meyer & Timothy J. Yeager, 2001. "Are small rural banks vulnerable to local economic downturns?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 25-38.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedlsp:2002-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Xiao)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.