IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Bank Liability Structure, FDIC Loss, and Time to Failure: A Quantile Regression Approach

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Klaus Schaeck

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10693-008-0028-5
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer & Western Finance Association in its journal Journal of Financial Services Research.

Volume (Year): 33 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 163-179

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:33:y:2008:i:3:p:163-179
DOI: 10.1007/s10693-008-0028-5
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Web page: http://westernfinance.org/

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/journal/10693

Keywords: Bank liability structure; loss given default; market discipline; time to failure; quantile regression;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Adam B. Ashcraft, 2005. "Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced Failure of Healthy Banks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1712-1730, December.
  2. Cole, Rebel A. & Gunther, Jeffery W., 1995. "Separating the likelihood and timing of bank failure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 1073-1089, September.
  3. Barth, James R & Bartholomew, Philip F & Bradley, Michael, 1990. " Determinants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 731-754, July.
  4. Goldberg, Lawrence G. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 2002. "Depositor discipline and changing strategies for regulating thrift institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 263-274, February.
  5. John S. Jordan, 2000. "Depositor discipline at failing banks," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 15-28.
  6. Maechler, Andrea M. & McDill, Kathleen M., 2006. "Dynamic depositor discipline in US banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1871-1898, July.
  7. Koenker,Roger, 2005. "Quantile Regression," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521845731, December.
  8. John R. Hall & Thomas B. King & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2002. "Did FDICIA enhance market discipline on community banks? a look at evidence from the jumbo-CD market," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2002-04, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  9. Billett, Matthew T. & Garfinkel, Jon A. & O'Neal, Edward S., 1998. "The cost of market versus regulatory discipline in banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 333-358, June.
  10. James, Christopher, 1991. " The Losses Realized in Bank Failures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1223-1242, September.
  11. Andrew Davenport & Kathleen McDill, 2006. "The Depositor Behind the Discipline: A Micro-Level Case Study of Hamilton Bank," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 30(1), pages 93-109, August.
  12. Koenker, Roger W & Bassett, Gilbert, Jr, 1978. "Regression Quantiles," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 33-50, January.
  13. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1994. "Underlying determinants of closed-bank resolution costs," Working Paper 9403, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  14. Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-364, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as
in new window


Cited by:

  1. Klaus Schaeck & Martin Cihak & Andrea Maechler & Stephanie Stolz, 2011. "Who Disciplines Bank Managers?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 197-243.
  2. DeYoung, Robert & Torna, Gökhan, 2013. "Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 397-421.
  3. Bennett, Rosalind L. & Hwa, Vivian & Kwast, Myron L., 2015. "Market discipline by bank creditors during the 2008–2010 crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 51-69.
  4. Sánchez-Vidal, F. Javier, 2014. "High debt companies' leverage determinants in Spain: A quantile regression approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 455-465.
  5. Huang, Ying Sophie & Chen, Carl R. & Kato, Isamu, 2017. "Different strokes by different folks: The dynamics of hedge fund systematic risk exposure and performance," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 367-388.
  6. Rebel Cole & Lawrence White, 2012. "Déjà Vu All Over Again: The Causes of U.S. Commercial Bank Failures This Time Around," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 42(1), pages 5-29, October.
  7. Bennett, Rosalind L. & Unal, Haluk, 2014. "The effects of resolution methods and industry stress on the loss on assets from bank failures," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 18-31.
  8. Vincent Bouvatier & Michael Brei & Xi Yang, 2014. "Bank Failures and the Source of Strength Doctrine," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-15, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  9. McAndrews, James J. & Morgan, Donald P. & Santos, Joao A. C. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2014. "What makes large bank failures so messy and what should be done about it?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 229-244.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:33:y:2008:i:3:p:163-179. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Rebekah McClure)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.