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Bank Liability Structure, FDIC Loss, and Time to Failure: A Quantile Regression Approach

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  • Klaus Schaeck

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10693-008-0028-5
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Financial Services Research.

Volume (Year): 33 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 163-179

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:33:y:2008:i:3:p:163-179
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102934

Keywords: Bank liability structure; loss given default; market discipline; time to failure; quantile regression;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Rebel A. Cole & Jeffery W. Gunther, 1993. "Separating the likelihood and timing of bank failure," Financial Industry Studies Working Paper 93-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  2. James, Christopher, 1991. " The Losses Realized in Bank Failures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1223-42, September.
  3. Maechler, Andrea M. & McDill, Kathleen M., 2006. "Dynamic depositor discipline in US banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1871-1898, July.
  4. Roger Koenker & Kevin F. Hallock, 2001. "Quantile Regression," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 143-156, Fall.
  5. Goldberg, Lawrence G. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 2002. "Depositor discipline and changing strategies for regulating thrift institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 263-274, February.
  6. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1994. "Underlying determinants of closed-bank resolution costs," Working Paper 9403, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  7. Billett, Matthew T. & Garfinkel, Jon A. & O'Neal, Edward S., 1998. "The cost of market versus regulatory discipline in banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 333-358, June.
  8. John S. Jordan, 2000. "Depositor discipline at failing banks," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 15-28.
  9. Adam B. Ashcraft, 2003. "Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced failure of healthy banks," Staff Reports 176, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  10. John R. Hall & Thomas B. King & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2002. "Did FDICIA enhance market discipline on community banks? a look at evidence from the jumbo-CD market," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2002-04, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  11. Barth, James R & Bartholomew, Philip F & Bradley, Michael, 1990. " Determinants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 731-54, July.
  12. Koenker, Roger W & Bassett, Gilbert, Jr, 1978. "Regression Quantiles," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 33-50, January.
  13. Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-64, August.
  14. Andrew Davenport & Kathleen McDill, 2006. "The Depositor Behind the Discipline: A Micro-Level Case Study of Hamilton Bank," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 93-109, August.
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Cited by:

  1. McAndrews, James J. & Morgan, Donald P. & Santos, Joao A. C. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2014. "What makes large bank failures so messy and what should be done about it?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 229-244.
  2. Cole, Rebel A. & White, Lawrence J., 2010. "Déjà vu all over again: The causes of U.S. commercial bank failures this time around," MPRA Paper 24690, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Jul 2010.
  3. Klaus Schaeck & Martin Cihak & Andrea Maechler & Stephanie Stolz, 2011. "Who Disciplines Bank Managers?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 197-243.
  4. Vincent Bouvatier & Michael Brei & Xi Yang, 2014. "Bank Failures and the Source of Strength Doctrine," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-15, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  5. Sánchez-Vidal, F. Javier, 2014. "High debt companies' leverage determinants in Spain: A quantile regression approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 455-465.
  6. DeYoung, Robert & Torna, Gökhan, 2013. "Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 397-421.

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