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The Value of a Government Monitor for U.S. Banking Firms

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  • Flannery, Mark J
  • Houston, Joel F

Abstract

Do federal bank examinations add value to the market's supervisory process? To address this question, the author investigates whether Federal Reserve inspections of bank holding companies affect the association between banks' reported book values and the market value of their equity. Using data from the fourth quarters of 1988 and 1990, he finds that the market is aware of bank examinations and takes them into account when valuing bank stocks. Apart from the obvious value they provide to regulators, examinations affect market values in several ways. In some instances, they provide useful certifying information which reduces risk and increases market value. In other instances, examinations induce additional regulatory risk which may reduce market value. The net effect of these results appears to vary over time, and across different types of banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Flannery, Mark J & Houston, Joel F, 1999. "The Value of a Government Monitor for U.S. Banking Firms," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(1), pages 14-34, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:31:y:1999:i:1:p:14-34
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffery W. Gunther & Robert R. Moore, 2000. "Financial statements and reality: do troubled banks tell all?," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q3, pages 30-35.
    2. Allen N. Berger & Margaret K. Kyle & Joseph M. Scalise, 2001. "Did U.S. Bank Supervisors Get Tougher during the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier during the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending?," NBER Chapters,in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 301-356 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Dmytro Holod & Joe Peek, 2013. "The value to banks of small business lending," Working Papers 13-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    4. R. Alton Gilbert & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2006. "Can feedback from the jumbo CD market improve bank surveillance?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 135-175.
    5. Gunther, Jeffery W. & Moore, Robert R., 2003. "Loss underreporting and the auditing role of bank exams," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 153-177, April.
    6. Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Comparing market and supervisory assessments of bank performance: who knows what when?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 641-670.
    7. Gunther, Jeffery W. & Moore, Robert R., 2003. "Early warning models in real time," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(10), pages 1979-2001, October.
    8. John R. Hall & Thomas B. King & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2002. "Did FDICIA enhance market discipline on community banks? a look at evidence from the jumbo-CD market," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2002-04, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    9. Daniels, Kenneth N. & Vijayakumar, Jayaraman, 2007. "Does underwriter reputation matter in the municipal bond market?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(6), pages 500-519.
    10. Mark Flannery, 1999. "Modernizing Financial Regulation: The Relation Between Interbank Transactions and Supervisory Reform," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 101-116, December.
    11. John S. Jordan, 1999. "Pricing bank stocks: the contribution of bank examinations," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 39-53.
    12. John S. Jordan & Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 1999. "Impact of greater bank disclosure amidst a banking crisis," Working Papers 99-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    13. Linda Allen & Julapa Jagtiani & James Moser, 2001. "Further Evidence on the Information Content of Bank Examination Ratings: A Study of BHC-to-FHC Conversion Applications," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 213-232, October.
    14. Kick, Thomas & Koetter, Michael & Poghosyan, Tigran, 2010. "Recovery determinants of distressed banks: Regulators, market discipline, or the environment?," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2010,02, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    15. David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, 1999. "The contribution of on-site examination ratings to an emprircal model of bank failures," Working Papers 1999-023, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    16. Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2002. "Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of deposit insurance reform, funding manager decisions and bond market liquidity," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-46, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. Jo-Hui Chen & Chih-Sean Chen, 2011. "The effects of international off-site surveillance on bank rating changes," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 45(6), pages 1313-1329, October.
    18. R. Alton Gilbert & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2000. "The role of a CAMEL downgrade model in bank surveillance," Working Papers 2000-021, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    19. Petrella, Giovanni & Resti, Andrea, 2013. "Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5406-5420.
    20. Carow, Kenneth A. & Cox, Steven R. & Roden, Dianne M., 2004. "Mutual holding companies: Evidence of conflicts of interest through disparate dividends," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 277-298, February.
    21. R. Alton Gilbert & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2002. "Can feedback from the jumbo-CD market improve off-site surveillance of community banks?," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2002-08, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    22. R. Alton Gilbert & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2002. "Could a CAMELS downgrade model improve off-site surveillance?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan., pages 47-63.
    23. Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2004. "A reconsideration of the risk sensitivity of U.S. banking organization subordinated debt spreads: a sample selection approach," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 73-92.
    24. Frederick T. Furlong & Robard Williams, 2006. "Financial market signals and banking supervision: are current practices consistent with research findings?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 17-29.

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