The competitive effects of risk-based bank capital regulation: an example from U.S. mortgage markets
Basel II bank capital regulations are designed to be substantially more risk sensitive than the current regulations. In the United States, only the largest banks would be required to adopt Basel II; other depositories could choose to adopt such standards or to remain under the Basel I capital standards. We consider possible effects of this two-pronged or "bifurcated" approach on the market for residential mortgages. Specifically, we analyze whether those institutions that adopt Basel II will enjoy lower costs than nonadopters and whether they have an incentive to retain mortgages in their own portfolios. We find that (1) despite the large differences in regulatory capital requirements between adopters and nonadopters, it is unlikely that there will be any measurable effect of Basel II implementation on most mortgage rates and, consequently, any direct impact on the competition between adopters and nonadopters for originating or holding residential mortgages; (2) the most significant competitive impact may be felt among mortgage securitizers; and (3) adopters might have increased profits from some mortgages relative to nonadopters because they will capture some of the deadweight losses that occur under the current regulatory regime, but nonadopters would likely retain their market shares.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/fedsorder.html|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jones, David, 2000. "Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 35-58, January.
- Steven A. Sharpe, 2002.
"Reexamining Stock Valuation and Inflation: The Implications Of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 84(4), pages 632-648, November.
- Steven A. Sharpe, 2001. "Reexamining stock valuation and inflation: the implications of analysts' earnings forecasts," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-32, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Diana Hancock & Andreas Lehnert & Wayne Passmore & Shane M. Sherlund, 2005. "An analysis of the potential competitive impacts of Basel II capital standards on U.S. mortgage rates and mortgage securitization," Basel II White Paper 3, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Calem, Paul S. & LaCour-Little, Michael, 2004. "Risk-based capital requirements for mortgage loans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 647-672, March.
- Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
- Duca, John V & Rosenthal, Stuart S, 1994. "Do Mortgage Rates Vary Based on Household Default Characteristics? Evidence on Rate Sorting and Credit Rationing," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 99-113, March.
- Irina Barakova & Raphael Bostic & Paul Calem & Susan Wachter, .
"Does Credit Quality Matter for Homeownership?,"
Zell/Lurie Center Working Papers
410, Wharton School Samuel Zell and Robert Lurie Real Estate Center, University of Pennsylvania.
- Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Robert B. Avery & Paul S. Calem & Glenn B. Canner, 2004. "Credit report accuracy and access to credit," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Sum, pages 297-322.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Jones, David & Mingo, John, 1999. "Credit risk modeling and internal capital allocation processes: implications for a models-based regulatory bank capital standard," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 79-108, March.
- Lawrence J. White & W. Scott Frame, 2004.
"Emerging Competition and Risk-Taking Incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,"
04-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2004. "Emerging competition and risk-taking incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," Working Paper 2004-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2004. "Emerging competition and risk-taking incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," Proceedings 922, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore & Brian J. Surette, 1996. "Distribution of credit risk among providers of mortgages to lower- income and minority homebuyers," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Dec, pages 1077-1102.
- Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mingo, John J., 2000. "Policy implications of the Federal Reserve study of credit risk models at major US banking institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 15-33, January.
- Peter M. DeMarzo, 2005. "The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 1-35.
- Wendy Edelberg, 2003. "Risk-based pricing of interest rates in household loan markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-62, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2006-46. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kris Vajs)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.