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Liquidity creation without a lender of last resort: clearing house loan certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907

  • Ellis W. Tallman
  • Jon R. Moen

We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearing house loan certificates were essentially “bridge loans” arranged between clearing house members. They enabled and were issued in anticipation of gold imports, which took a few weeks to arrive. The large, New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York Clearing House issuing) a volume of clearing house loan certificates beyond their own immediate liquidity needs, in accord with their role as central reserve city banks in the national banking system.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 1010.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1010
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  1. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(02), pages 277-283, June.
  2. Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002. "Banking Panics and the Origin of Central Banking," NBER Working Papers 9137, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Officer, Lawrence H, 1986. "The Efficiency of the Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard, 1890-1908," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1038-73, October.
  4. Frederick R. Macaulay, 1938. "Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by the Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States since 1856," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number maca38-1, July.
  5. Miron, Jeffrey A. & Romer, Christina D., 1990. "A New Monthly Index of Industrial Production, 1884–1940," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(02), pages 321-337, June.
  6. Ellis W. Tallman, 2012. "The Panic of 1907," Working Paper 1228, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  7. Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-64, November.
  8. Tallman, Ellis & Moen, Jon, 1998. "Gold Shocks, Liquidity, and the United States Economy during the National Banking Era," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 381-404, October.
  9. Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, 1999. "Why didn't the United States establish a central bank until after the panic of 1907?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper No. 99-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  10. Gorton, Gary & Mullineaux, Donald J, 1987. "The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank Clearinghouses," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 457-68, November.
  11. Timberlake, Richard H, Jr, 1984. "The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, February.
  12. Donaldson, R. Glen, 1992. "Costly liquidation, interbank trade, bank runs and panics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 59-82, March.
  13. Odell, Kerry A. & Weidenmier, Marc D., 2004. "Real Shock, Monetary Aftershock: The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and the Panic of 1907," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(04), pages 1002-1027, December.
  14. Clark, Truman A, 1984. "Violations of the Gold Points, 1890-1908," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(5), pages 791-823, October.
  15. Gorton, Gary & Huang, Lixin, 2006. "Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1613-1629, October.
  16. Moen, Jon & Tallman, Ellis W., 1992. "The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role of Trust Companies," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(03), pages 611-630, September.
  17. Ellis W. Tallman & Jon R. Moen, 1995. "Private sector responses to the Panic of 1907: a comparison of New York and Chicago," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Mar, pages 1-9.
  18. James J. McAndrews & Simon M. Potter, 2002. "Liquidity effects of the events of September 11, 2001," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Nov, pages 59-79.
  19. John A. James & David F. Weiman, 2010. "From Drafts to Checks: The Evolution of Correspondent Banking Networks and the Formation of the Modern U.S. Payments System, 1850-1914," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2-3), pages 237-265, 03.
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