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Close but not a central bank: The New York Clearing House and issues of clearing house loan certificates

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  • Jon R. Moen
  • Ellis W. Tallman

Abstract

The paper examines the New York Clearing House (NYCH) as a lender of last resort by looking at clearing-house-loan-certificate borrowing during five banking panics of the National Banking Era (1863?1913). In that system, adequate aggregate liquidity provision was passive and dependent upon member bank borrowing. We document bank borrowing behavior using bank-level data for clearing-house loan certifi cates issued to NYCH member banks. The historical record reveals that the large New York City banks behaved in ways that resembled those of a central bank in 1884 and in 1890, but less so in the more severe crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, 2013. "Close but not a central bank: The New York Clearing House and issues of clearing house loan certificates," Working Papers (Old Series) 1308, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1308
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tallman, Ellis W. & Moen, Jon R., 2012. "Liquidity creation without a central bank: Clearing house loan certificates in the banking panic of 1907," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 277-291.
    2. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 277-283, June.
    3. Wicker,Elmus, 2000. "Banking Panics of the Gilded Age," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521770231, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Moen, Jon & Tallman, Ellis, 2018. "Outside Lending in the New York City Call Loan Market," MPRA Paper 88733, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Gary Gorton & Ellis W. Tallman, 2016. "How Did Pre-Fed Banking Panics End?," NBER Working Papers 22036, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Gary Gorton & Ellis W. Tallman, 2016. "Too Big to Fail before the Fed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 528-532, May.
    4. Jaremski, Matthew, 2015. "Clearinghouses as credit regulators before the fed?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 10-21.
    5. Christopher Hoag, 2015. "Clearinghouse Loan Certificates as a Lender of Last Resort," Working Papers 1503, Trinity College, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2015.
    6. Christopher Hoag, 2015. "Clearinghouse Loan Certificates as Interbank Loans," Working Papers 1504, Trinity College, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2015.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial crises; Lenders of last resort; Clearinghouses (Banking); Interbank market;
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