O.M.W. Sprague (the Man who "Wrote the Book" on Financial Crises) and the Founding of the Federal Reserve
O.M.W. Sprague was America's leading expert on financial crises when America was debating establishing the Federal Reserve. His History of Crises under the National Banking Act is one of the most enduring legacies of the National Monetary Commission; a still frequently cited classic. Since the Commission recommended a central bank, and its recommendation after some modifications became the Federal Reserve System, it might be assumed that Sprague was a strong supporter of establishing a central bank. But he was not. Initially, Sprague favored more limited reforms, a position that he did not abandon until the Federal Reserve became a fait accompli. Here I discuss the sources of Sprague's opposition to a central bank and the relationship of that opposition to his understanding of the history and structure of the American banking system at the turn of the nineteenth century.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2013|
|Publication status:||published as Hugh Rockoff, 2015. "O.M.W. Sprague (the man who “wrote the book” on financial crises) and the founding of the Federal Reserve," Journal of Financial Stability, vol 17, pages 35-45.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moen, Jon R. & Tallman, Ellis W., 2000.
"Clearinghouse Membership and Deposit Contraction during the Panic of 1907,"
The Journal of Economic History,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(01), pages 145-163, March.
- Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, 1994. "Clearinghouse access and bank runs: trust companies in New York and Chicago during the Panic of 1907," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 94-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- James M. Nason & Ellis W. Tallman, 2012. "Business cycles and financial crises: the roles of credit supply and demand shocks," Working Paper 1221, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 01 Aug 2013.
- Jacobson, Margaret M. & Tallman, Ellis W., 2015. "Liquidity provision during the crisis of 1914: Private and public sources," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 22-34.
- Margaret M. Jacobson & Ellis W. Tallman, 2013. "Liquidity provision during the crisis of 1914: private and public sources," Working Paper 1304, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 01 Oct 2014.
- William Walker Swanson, 1908. "The Crisis of 1860 and the First Issue of Clearing-House Certificates: II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16, pages 212-212.
- Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(02), pages 277-283, June.
- Timberlake, Richard H, Jr, 1984. "The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, February.
- Perry Mehrling, 2002. "Retrospectives: Economists and the Fed: Beginnings," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 207-218, Fall.
- Gorton, Gary & Mullineaux, Donald J, 1987. "The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank Clearinghouses," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 457-468, November.
- William L. Silber, 2007. "The Great Financial Crisis of 1914: What Can We Learn from Aldrich–Vreeland Emergency Currency?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 285-289, May.
- Wicker,Elmus, 2000. "Banking Panics of the Gilded Age," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521770231.
- John A. James & James McAndrews & David F. Weiman, 2013. "Wall Street and Main Street: the macroeconomic consequences of New York bank suspensions, 1866–1914," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 7(2), pages 99-130, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19758. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.