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Progressive Consumption Taxes

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  • Costa, Carlos Eugênio da
  • Santos, Marcelo Rodrigues dos

Abstract

In a static setting, whether consumption or labor income is progressively taxed is irrelevant for household choices and welfare. In a dynamic setting, however, these two forms of progressivity have markedly di erent implications for how earnings vary along the life-cycle: in a stylized life-cycle model, progressive income tax act reducing Frisch elasticities of labor supply whereas progressive consumption taxes act reducing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. After showing that the latter leads to less ine ciencies in the stylized model than the former, we explore the consequences of replacing the current U.S. tax system by one in which labor income are linear and consumption taxes are progressive. We nd welfare gains that exceed 10% in consumption equivalent variation terms for all possible speci cations in steady state comparisons. Welfare gains are attained in all our speci cations with either very small increases in the capital stock or even large declines.

Suggested Citation

  • Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Santos, Marcelo Rodrigues dos, 2020. "Progressive Consumption Taxes," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 819, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
  • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgewp:819
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    Cited by:

    1. da Costa, Carlos E. & Santos, Marcelo R., 2023. "Progressive consumption taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    2. Bettoni, Luis G. & Santos, Marcelo, 2023. "Optimal fiscal policy in incomplete market business cycle economies," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 218-226.

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    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor

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