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Optimal unemployment benefit financing scheme : A transatlantic comparison

  • Julien Albertini

    ()

    (Centre d’Études des politiques Économiques de l’Université d’Evry (EPEE et TEPP (FR CNRS no 3126)))

  • Xavier Fairise

    ()

    (Centre d’Études des politiques Économiques de l’Université d’Evry (EPEE et TEPP (FR CNRS no 3126)))

The aim of this paper is to study the properties of an optimal unemployment benefit financing scheme in the US and in France. We wonder if firms should be taxed in proportion of their layoffs and if such a tax should correspond to a part or all of the fiscal cost induced by a dismissal. The welfare gains generated by reforms of the US and French labor market institutions are evaluated. The US labor market is initially characterized by a flexible dismissal regulation and an experience rating system. We show that making firms more responsible for the cost caused by theirs layoff is welfare enhancing. Concerning the French labor market, we find that a more flexible dismissal regulation combined with an experience rating tax may significantly improve labor market performances. In both cases, the efficient layoff tax is close to the expected fiscal cost of an unemployed worker.

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File URL: http://epee.univ-evry.fr/RePEc/2009/09-01.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne in its series Documents de recherche with number 09-01.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eve:wpaper:09-01
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  1. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 25-49, March.
  2. Francesco Zanetti, 2006. "Labor Market Institutions and Aggregate Fluctuations in a Search and Matching Model," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 445, Society for Computational Economics.
  3. Garey Ramey & Wouter J. den Haan & Joel Watson, 2000. "Job Destruction and Propagation of Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 482-498, June.
  4. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbe, Franck, 2008. "Employment protection reform in search economies," Les Cahiers de Recherche 910, HEC Paris.
  5. Andolfatto, David, 1996. "Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 112-32, March.
  6. Joseph, G. & Pierrard, O. & Sneessens, H. R., 2004. "Job turnover, unemployment and labor market institutions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 451-468, August.
  7. Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie & Uribe, Martín, 2001. "Solving Dynamic General Equilibrium Models Using a Second-Order Approximation to the Policy Function," CEPR Discussion Papers 2963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. David Card & Phillip B. Levine, 1992. "Unemployment Insurance Taxes and the Cyclical and Seasonal Properties of Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 4030, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Pierre Cahuc & Franck Malherbet, 2001. "Unemployment Compensation Finance and Labor Market Rigidity," Working Papers 2001-37, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  10. Cahuc, Pierre & Gianella, Christian & Goux, Dominique & Zylberberg, Andre, 2002. "Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 3510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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