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Urban Governance and Finance in India

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  • Richard.M. Bird
  • M. Govinda Rao

Abstract

Over 330 million people live in India’s cities; 35 cities have a population of over a million and three (Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata) of the 10 largest metropolises in the world are in India. India’s cities are large, economically important, and growing. However, neither urban infrastructure nor the level of urban public services is adequate for current needs, let alone to meet growing demands. This paper attempts to point the way towards some possible solutions by analysing urban governance and finance in India in the context of lessons drawn from fiscal federalism theory and experiences of governance institutions and financing systems both in India and around the world. [NIPFP WP No. 68].

Suggested Citation

  • Richard.M. Bird & M. Govinda Rao, 2010. "Urban Governance and Finance in India," Working Papers id:2495, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2495
    Note: Institutional Papers
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simanti Bandyopadhyay & M. Govinda Rao, 2009. "Fiscal Health of Selected Indian Cities," Development Economics Working Papers 22970, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    2. János Kornai, 2014. "The soft budget constraint," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 64(supplemen), pages 25-79, November.
    3. R. Kavita Rao, 2008. "Goods and Services Tax for India," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22976, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    4. Slack, Enid, 2007. "Managing the coordination of service delivery in metropolitan cities : the role of metropolitan governance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4317, The World Bank.
    5. Enid Slack & Juan R. Cuadrado-Roura & José Miguel Fernández Güell & Eduardo Rojas & Richard Bird & Jeroen Klink & Christian Lefévre & Joan Subirats & Quim Brugué & Andrés Monzón & Alberto Etchegaray, 2005. "Governing the Metropolis: Principles and Cases," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 79939 edited by Juan R. Cuadrado-Roura & José Miguel Fernández Güell & Eduardo Rojas, February.
    6. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    7. Richard M. Bird & François Vaillancourt, 2006. "Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6953, April.
    8. Breton,Albert, 1998. "Competitive Governments," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521646284, January.
    9. Weingast, Barry R., 2009. "Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 279-293, May.
    10. Jonathan A. Rodden & Gunnar S. Eskeland (ed.), 2003. "Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262182297, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Smoke, 2016. "Looking Beyond Conventional Intergovernmental Fiscal Frameworks: Principles, Realities, and Neglected Issues," ADBI Working Papers 606, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    2. Daniel Henstra & Jason Thistlethwaite, 2017. "Climate Change, Floods, and Municipal Risk Sharing in Canada," IMFG Papers 30, University of Toronto, Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance.
    3. Sharma, Purva, 2020. "Opportunities and struggles of decentralized governance reform for urban municipalities in India," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 17(C).
    4. Simanti Bandyopadhyay & Debraj Bagchi, 2013. "Are User Charges Underutilsed in Indian Cities? An Analysis for Delhi," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1326, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    5. Simanti Bandyopadhyay, 2012. "Performance Evaluation of Urban Local Governments: A Case for Indian Cities," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1232, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Simanti Bandyopadhyay, 2013. "Property Tax Reforms in India: A Comparison of Delhi and Bangalore," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1321, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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