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On the Co-evolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis

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  • Werner Güth

    ()

  • Hartmut Kliemt
  • M. Vittoria Levati

    ()

  • Geog von Wangenheim

Abstract

Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are aware of their own type and observe the population share of other types. The material success of various types and their co-evolution are analyzed, and it is checked whether the dynamics of the indirect evolutionary analysis are replicated in the laboratory.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levati & Geog von Wangenheim, 2006. "On the Co-evolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-18, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2006-18
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
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    8. Sandra Güth & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2002. "The Dynamics of Trustworthiness Among the Few," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 53(4), pages 369-388.
    9. Selten, Reinhard, 1998. "Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 413-436, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gehrig, Thomas & Guth, Werner & Levati, Vittoria & Levinsky, Rene & Ockenfels, Axel & Uske, Tobias & Weiland, Torsten, 2007. "Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 692-703, December.
    2. Christoph Engel & Urs Schweizer, 2007. "Editorial Preface," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 1-4, March.
    3. Lisa Bruttel & Werner G�th, 2013. "Alternating or compensating? An experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game," TWI Research Paper Series 86, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    4. Werner Gueth & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levati, 2009. "(Over-)Stylizing Experimental Findings and Theorizing with Sweeping Generality," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 0(16), November.
    5. Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, 2012. "Assuring Adequate Deterrence in Tort: A Public Good Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    6. Schmitt, Rebecca, 2015. "Incorporating Phenotype Plasticity into the Indirect Evolutionary Approach," MPRA Paper 65734, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Markus Pasche, 2008. "Zum Erklärungsgehalt der verhaltensorientierten Spieltheorie," Jena Research Papers in Business and Economics - Working and Discussion Papers (Expired!) 04/2008, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, School of Economics and Business Administration.
    8. Theodore Eisenberg, 2007. "Evidence of the Need for Aggregate Litigation. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 158-162, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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