(Over-)Stylizing experimental findings and theorizing with sweeping generality
Human decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing motivations that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength and circumstances. "Over-stylizing" neglects such competing concerns and context-dependence, although it facilitates the emergence of elaborate general theories. We illustrate by examples from social dilemma experiments and inequality aversion theories that sweeping empirical claims should be avoided.
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- Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Ockenfels, Peter, 1996. "Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 593-604, May.
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- Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levati & Georg von Wangenheim, 2007.
"On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 143-157, March.
- Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levati & Geog von Wangenheim, 2006. "On the Co-evolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-18, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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