IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jecrev/v53y2002i4p369-388.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Dynamics of Trustworthiness Among the Few

Author

Listed:
  • Sandra Güth
  • Werner Güth
  • Hartmut Kliemt

Abstract

Conventional stochastic models of evolutionary processes with infinitely many agents are deterministic models in disguise. Only finite population models become truly stochastic. Therefore this paper focuses on an indirect evolutionary model of pair wise interaction in a pool of three (corresponding to analysing oligopolies in terms of duopoly markets). The outcomes of the process over the long haul are characterized by the stationary distribution of the underlying Markov process. Our example indicates that intermediate cases cannot be seen as convex combinations of the two polar non‐stochastic cases of two or infinitely many individuals. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandra Güth & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2002. "The Dynamics of Trustworthiness Among the Few," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 53(4), pages 369-388, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:53:y:2002:i:4:p:369-388
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5876.00234
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5876.00234
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levati & Georg von Wangenheim, 2007. "On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 143-157, March.
    2. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, 2006. "Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:53:y:2002:i:4:p:369-388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley Content Delivery). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/jeaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.