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Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -

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  • Werner Güth

    ()

  • Hartmut Kliemt
  • Stefan Napel

Abstract

If the (un)trustworthy are rare, people will talk about them, making their detection more reliable and / or less costly. When, however, both types appear in large numbers, detecting (un)trustworthiness will be considerably more difficult and possibly too costly. Based on Güth and Kliemt (2000) we analyze how the composition of a population of trustworthy, resp. untrustworthy individuals evolves if the cost and reliability of type detection depend on the population composition.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, 2006. "Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2006-08
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    File URL: ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2006-08.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reinoud Joosten & Thomas Brenner & Ulrich Witt, 2003. "Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(4), pages 609-620, September.
    2. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
    3. Sandra Güth & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2002. "The Dynamics of Trustworthiness Among the Few," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 53(4), pages 369-388, December.
    4. Selten, Reinhard, 1988. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 223-266, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meier, Stephan & Pierce, Lamar & Vaccaro, Antonino, 2014. "Trust and In-Group Favoritism in a Culture of Crime," IZA Discussion Papers 8169, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Werner Güth & Manfred Stadler, 2007. "Path dependence without denying deliberation— a continuous transition model connecting teleology and evolution," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-52, February.

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