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Path dependence without denying deliberation— a continuous transition model connecting teleology and evolution

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Güth

    ()

  • Manfred Stadler

    ()

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Manfred Stadler, 2007. "Path dependence without denying deliberation— a continuous transition model connecting teleology and evolution," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-52, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:17:y:2007:i:1:p:45-52
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-006-0043-3
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00191-006-0043-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, 2006. "Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    2. Guth, Werner & Nikiforakis, Nikos & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2007. "Vertical cross-shareholding: Theory and experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 69-89, February.
    3. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, "undated". "From Teleology to Evolution Bridging the gap between rationality and adaptation in social explanation," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-24, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Teleology; Trust; Information; Evolution; Social norms; C72; B52; B59;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • B59 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Other

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