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Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System

  • Gros, Daniel

There is general agreement that banking supervision and resolution have to be organised at the same level. It is often argued, however, that there is no need to tackle deposit insurance because it is too politically sensitive. This note proposes to apply the principles of subsidiarity and re-insurance to deposit insurance: Existing national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) would continue to operate much as before (with only minimal standards set by an EU directive), but they would be required to take out re-insurance against risks that would be too large to be covered by them. A European Reinsurance Fund (EReIF) would provide this reinsurance financed by premia paid by the national DGSs, just as any reinsurance company does in the private sector. The European Fund would pay out only in case of large losses. This ‘deductible’ would provide the national authorities with the proper incentives, but the reinsurance cover would stabilize depositor confidence even in the case of large shocks. Ideally the national DGSs would be responsible also for resolution. Experience has shown banking systems are more stable if deposit insurers are also responsible for resolution. The approach proposed here could thus be also used to design the ‘Single Resolution Mechanism’ (SRM) which is being discussed as a complement to the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM). It will of course take time to build up the funding for such a reinsurance fund. This approach is thus not meant to deal with legacy problems from the current crisis.

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File URL: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PB%20No%20288%20DG%20Deposit%20Reinsurance.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre for European Policy Studies in its series CEPS Papers with number 7958.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:7958
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  1. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update," CEPS Papers 7276, Centre for European Policy Studies.
  2. Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir & Nicolas Véron & Guntram B. Wolff, 2012. "What kind of European banking union?," Policy Contributions 731, Bruegel.
  3. André Sapir & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Nicolas Véron & Guntram Wolff, 2012. "What Kind of Banking Union ?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/174288, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  4. Beck, Thorsten & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Resolution of failed banks by deposit insurers : cross-country evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3920, The World Bank.
  5. Jean Pisani-Ferry & Guntram B. Wolff, 2012. "The fiscal implications of a banking union," Policy Briefs 748, Bruegel.
  6. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund," CEPS Papers 6918, Centre for European Policy Studies.
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