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On The Future of Co-operatives

Author

Listed:
  • Hendrikse, G.W.J.
  • Veerman, C.P.

Abstract

Two extensions are formulated of the analysis of the allocation of decision rights in Hendrikse and Veerman (2001). First, the incomplete contracts in their article can be viewed as simple long-term contracts, i.e. it is not allowed to make the allocation of authority contingent on the circumstances. Contingent long-term contracts are now considered. Second, another aspect of decision rights is the frequency of meetings between the owners and managers of enterprises. This aspect will be addressed from a long-term contract perspective as well as a loss aversion perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrikse, G.W.J. & Veerman, C.P., 2003. "On The Future of Co-operatives," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2003-007-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:270
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 73-92.
    2. Fershtman, Chaim, 1996. "On the value of incumbency managerial reference points and loss aversion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 245-257, April.
    3. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    5. Luigi Zingales, 2000. "In Search of New Foundations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1623-1653, August.
    6. George Hendrikse & Jos Bijman, 2002. "Ownership Structure in Agrifood Chains: The Marketing Cooperative," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(1), pages 104-119.
    7. George W. J. Hendrikse & Cees P. Veerman, 2001. "Marketing Co‐operatives: An Incomplete Contracting Perspective," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 53-64, January.
    8. Lazear, Edward P, 1999. "Globalisation and the Market for Team-Mates," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages 15-40, March.
    9. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
    10. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," CRSP working papers 487, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    11. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84.
    12. F.A.J. Van Den Bosch & C.A.P. Veerman, 1980. "The influence of the large scale mechanization of ware potato growing upon supply responsiveness in The Netherlands (1955–1978)," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 7(1), pages 41-54.
    13. Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1999. "Informal Authority in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 56-73, April.
    14. George Hendrikse & Jos Bijman, 2002. "On the emergence of new growers' associations: self-selection versus countervailing power," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 29(2), pages 255-269, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hesselink, M. & van der Wiele, A., 2003. "Mystery Shopping: In-depth measurement of customer satisfaction," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2003-020-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    2. Hendrikse, G.W.J., 2003. "Governance of Chains and Networks: A Research Agenda," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2003-018-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    contingent control rights; frequency of board meetings;

    JEL classification:

    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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