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The Federal Reserve as global lender of last resort, 2007-2010

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  • Broz, Lawrence

Abstract

Passage of the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, in conjunction with a Supreme Court ruling supporting a Freedom of Information Act request, required the Federal Reserve (Fed) to disclose bank-specific information about its emergency lending during the financial crisis. The disclosures revealed the extent to which the Fed had served as a global lender of last resort, providing dollar liquidity to foreign banks and foreign central banks. I exploit these unanticipated disclosures on two levels. First, I use the disclosed information to evaluate the motivations behind the Fed's global lending during the crisis. My findings indicate that the Fed supported foreign banks in countries in which U.S. money center banks had high loan exposures, which suggests that the Fed served the interests of major U.S. banks. Second, I explore the congressional response to the revelation of the Fed's massive global lending. I analyze an "Audit the Fed" vote in the House of Representatives that would end the Fed's confidentiality about the banks and countries it supports and reduce its monetary policy independence. I find the influence of U.S. money center banks also extends to Congress by way of campaign contributions: contributions from these banks significantly reduce the likelihood that a representative will vote in favor of the bill. In addition, I find that right-wing representatives were substantially more likely than their left-wing peers to support the bill, which suggests that new congressional coalitions are forming on the role of the Fed in the (global) economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Broz, Lawrence, 2015. "The Federal Reserve as global lender of last resort, 2007-2010," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60951, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:60951
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    Cited by:

    1. Mabbett, Deborah & Schelkle, Waltraud, 2019. "Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90879, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Emmanuel Carré & Laurent Le Maux, 2018. "Globalisation financière et Dollar Swap Lines : la Réserve fédérale et la Banque centrale européenne durant la crise de 2007-2009," Working Papers hal-01933930, HAL.
    3. Daniel McDowell, 2019. "The (Ineffective) Financial Statecraft of China's Bilateral Swap Agreements," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 50(1), pages 122-143, January.
    4. Emmanuel Carré & Laurent Le Maux, 2018. "The Federal Reserve's Dollar Swap Lines and the European Central Bank during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009," Post-Print hal-02570211, HAL.
    5. Chmielewski Tomasz & Sławiński Andrzej, 2019. "Lessons from TARGET2 imbalances: The case for the ECB being a lender of last resort," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 5(2), pages 48-63, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign Default; Debt Crises; Political Survival; Networks; Voter Behavior.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R21 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Housing Demand

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