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Pecuniary Externality through Credit Constraints: Two Examples without Uncertainty

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This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on constrained inefficiencies in economies with financial frictions. The purpose is to present two simple examples, inspired by the stochastic models in Gersbach-Rochet (2012) and Lorenzoni (2008), of deterministic environments in which such inefficiencies arise through credit constraints. Common to both examples is a pecuniary externality, which operates through an asset price. In the second example, a simple transfer between two groups of agents can bring about a Pareto improvement. In a first best economy, there are no pecuniary externalities because marginal productivities are equalised. But when agents face credit constraints, there is a wedge between their marginal productivities and those of the non-credit-constrained agents. The wedge is the source of the pecuniary externality: economies with these kinds of imperfections in credit markets are not second-best efficient. This is akin to the constrained inefficiency of an economy with incomplete markets, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).

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  • John Moore, 2013. "Pecuniary Externality through Credit Constraints: Two Examples without Uncertainty," ESE Discussion Papers 233, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  • Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:233
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    1. Javier Bianchi, 2011. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3400-3426, December.
    2. Anton Korinek, 2011. "The New Economics of Prudential Capital Controls: A Research Agenda," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 59(3), pages 523-561, August.
    3. Hans Gersbach & Jean‐Charles Rochet, 2012. "Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44, pages 73-109, December.
    4. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2010. "Managing Credit Booms and Busts: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach," Working Paper Series WP10-12, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    5. Guido Lorenzoni, 2008. "Inefficient Credit Booms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 809-833.
    6. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2013. "Macroprudential Regulation Versus Mopping Up After the Crash," NBER Working Papers 18675, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Anton Korinek, 2011. "Systemic Risk-Taking: Amplification Effects, Externalities, and Regulatory Responses," NFI Working Papers 2011-WP-13, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    8. Zhiguo He & Péter Kondor, 2016. "Inefficient Investment Waves," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 735-780, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Berentsen, Aleksander & Huber, Samuel & Marchesiani, Alessandro, 2016. "The societal benefit of a financial transaction tax," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 303-323.
    2. Almazan, Andres & de Motta, Adolfo & Titman, Sheridan, 2015. "Debt, labor markets, and the creation and destruction of firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 636-657.
    3. Nicola Amendola & Leo Ferraris & Fabrizio Mattesini, 2016. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a Pure Currency Economy with Heterogenous Agents," CEIS Research Paper 394, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 02 Feb 2017.

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