Relational Accounts: An Answer for Women to the Compensation Negotiation Dilemma
Women face a compensation negotiation dilemma in which they have to weigh the economic benefits of asking for higher pay with the social risks of defying prescriptive sex stereotypes (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). In four experiments, we show that enhancing the legitimacy of women's compensation requests does not eliminate the social risk of asking, and that eliminating the social risk of asking is not sufficient to legitimize their requests. We identify strategies for overcoming the compensation negotiation dilemma using "relational accounts" that simultaneously explain why the negotiating behavior is appropriate under the circumstances and affirm concern for organizational relationships.
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- Bowles, Hannah Riley & Babcock, Linda & McGinn, Kathleen L., 2005. "Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation," Working Paper Series rwp05-051, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- David Blackaby & Alison L Booth & Jeff Frank, 2005.
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- Booth, Alison & Jeff Frank & David Blackaby, 2003. "Outside Offers and the Gender Pay Gap: Empirical Evidence from the UK Academic Labour Market," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 28, Royal Economic Society.
- Blackaby, David & Booth, Alison L & Frank, Jeff, 2002. "Outside Offers and the Gender Pay Gap: Empirical Evidence from the UK," CEPR Discussion Papers 3549, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tinsley, Catherine H. & O'Connor, Kathleen M. & Sullivan, Brandon A., 2002. "Tough guys finish last: the perils of a distributive reputation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 621-642, July.
- O'Connor, Kathleen M. & Arnold, Josh A., 2001. "Distributive Spirals: Negotiation Impasses and the Moderating Role of Disputant Self-Efficacy," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 148-176, January.
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