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Loyalty Shares with Tenure Voting - a Coasian bargain? Evidence from the Loi Florange Experiment

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  • Marco Becht
  • Yuliya Kamisarenka
  • Anete Pajuste

Abstract

French listed companies can issue shares that confer two votes per share after a holding period of at least two years (loyalty shares with tenure voting rights). In 2014 the default rule changed from one-share-one-vote to loyalty shares. The Coase theorem predicts that ceteris paribus shareholders rewrite the corporate charter to preserve the pre-reform structure. The theorem also predicts that the proportion of loyalty shares in initial public offerings is unchanged. The paper shows that most one-share-one-vote companies reverted to the prereform contract. The exception were firms with a stake held by the French state. In initial public offerings, the new default rule had an impact; the proportion of loyalty share statutes increased from about forty to fifty percent after the passage of the law. Companies that kept the same statutes have a significantly higher market to book ratio than companies forced into a different regime. The evidence is broadly consistent with the predictions of the Coase theorem, but only in the absence of conflicted parties with veto power.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Becht & Yuliya Kamisarenka & Anete Pajuste, 2018. "Loyalty Shares with Tenure Voting - a Coasian bargain? Evidence from the Loi Florange Experiment," Working Papers ECARES 2018-10, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/270013
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    Cited by:

    1. Chiara Mio & Elise Soerger Zaro & Marco Fasan, 2020. "Are loyalty shares an effective antidote against short‐termism? Empirical evidence from Italy," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 1785-1796, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Loyalty shares; tenure voting; time-phased voting; dual-class shares; one-shareone- vote; Coase theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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