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Costly and Truthful Communication: Two Alternative Objectives

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  • Olivier Body

Abstract

This paper is about costly and truthful communication. I show that in a situation where a sender tries to convince a receiver to accept a project, the receiver's communication objective and effort depend on whether the receiver would reject or accept the project without any communication.If without communication the receiver would reject the project, his communication objective is to identify and accept a high quality project. His effort depends positively on his gain of accepting a high quality project. If without communication the receiver would accept the project, his communication objective is to identify and reject a low quality project. His effort depends positively on his loss from accepting a low quality project.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Body, 2014. "Costly and Truthful Communication: Two Alternative Objectives," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-10, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/156417
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    2. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February.
    3. John C. Driscoll & Steinar Holden, 2004. "Fairness and Inflation Persistence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 240-251, 04/05.
    4. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Body, 2014. "When Is Speech Silver and Silence Golden ?A Field Experiment on an Information Campaign," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-32, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Olivier Body & RĂ©gine Kolinsky, 2014. "To Win or Not to Lose: an Experiment on Communication Efforts," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-17, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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