Do business angels alter the risk-return equation in early stage investments? Business angels as seen by venture capitalists in the German speaking countries
Venture capitalists in German-speaking countries do not value the contribution of business angels in co-invested deals. Business angels do not reduce the risk perceived by venture capitalists in early-stage deals, even if the business angels have what venture capitalists regard as an ideal profile. Venture capitalists also refute that deals with business angels typically generate higher internal rates of return than deals without business angels.
|Date of creation:||12 Oct 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: IESE Business School, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN|
Web page: http://www.iese.edu/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2003.
"Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
- Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2000. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," CRSP working papers 513, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Kaplan, Steven & Strömberg, Per Johan, 2000. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets The Real World: An Empirical Analysis Of Venture Capital Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 2421, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2000. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," NBER Working Papers 7660, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard T. Harrison & Colin M. Mason, 2000. "Venture capital market complementarities: The links between business angels and venture capital funds in the United Kingdom," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(3), pages 223-242, July.
- Gompers, Paul & Lerner, Josh, 1999. "An analysis of compensation in the U.S. venture capital partnership," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 3-44, January.
- Steven Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, 2003. "Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital," NBER Working Papers 9807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gifford, Sharon, 1997. "Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 459-482, November.
- Chan, Yuk-Shee & Siegel, Daniel R & Thakor, Anjan V, 1990. "Learning, Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(2), pages 365-381, May.
- John Freear & Jeffrey E. Sohl & William Wetzel, 2002. "Angles on angels: Financing technology-based ventures - a historical perspective," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(4), pages 275-287, October.
- Kevin Hindle & Robert Wenban, 1999. "Australia's informal venture capitalists: An exploratory profile," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 169-186, April.
- Fiet, James O., 1995. "Reliance upon informants in the venture capital industry," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 195-223, May.
- Landstrom, Hans, 1993. "Informal risk capital in Sweden and some international comparisons," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 8(6), pages 525-540, November.
- James A. Brander & Raphael Amit & Werner Antweiler, 2002. "Venture-Capital Syndication: Improved Venture Selection vs. The Value-Added Hypothesis," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 423-452, 09.
- Gompers, Paul A, 1995. " Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1461-1489, December.
- Andrei A. Kirilenko, 2001. "Valuation and Control in Venture Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(2), pages 565-587, 04.
- Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1994. " Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 371-402, June.
- LESHCHINSKII, Dima, 2002. "Indulgent angels or stingy venture capitalists? The entrepreneurs' choice," Les Cahiers de Recherche 769, HEC Paris.
- Lerner, Joshua, 1998. ""Angel" financing and public policy: An overview," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 773-783, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0655. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Noelia Romero)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.