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Valuation and Control in Venture Finance

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  • Andrei A. Kirilenko

Abstract

This paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm. I assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm. I show that to separate the entrepreneur's value of control from the firm's expected payoff, the venture capitalist demands disproportionately highercontrol rights than the size of his equity investment. The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing. Copyright The American Finance Association 2001.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrei A. Kirilenko, 2001. "Valuation and Control in Venture Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(2), pages 565-587, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:56:y:2001:i:2:p:565-587
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ambec, S., 2004. "On the governance of start-ups," Working Papers 200406, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    2. Kwanghui Lim & Brian Cu, 2012. "The effects of social networks and contractual characteristics on the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 573-596, September.
    3. Rin, Marco Da & Hellmann, Thomas & Puri, Manju, 2013. "A Survey of Venture Capital Research," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Elsevier.
    4. Frank A. Schmid, 2001. "Equity financing of the entrepreneurial firm," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov., pages 15-28.
    5. Hellmann, Thomas, 2006. "IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 649-679, September.
    6. Denis, David J., 2004. "Entrepreneurial finance: an overview of the issues and evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 301-326, March.
    7. Cumming, D. & Johan, S.A., 2005. "Is it the law or the lawyers? Investment fund covenants," Discussion Paper 2005-005, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    8. repec:bla:stratm:v:38:y:2017:i:2:p:255-277 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Вавилов С.А. & Светлов К.В., 2015. "Оценка Стоимости Кредитования Венчурных Проектов На Основе Метода Реплицирующего Портфеля," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 51(4), pages 76-84, октябрь.
    10. Heukamp, Franz & Liechtenstein, Heinrich & Wakeling, Nick, 2006. "Do business angels alter the risk-return equation in early stage investments? Business angels as seen by venture capitalists in the German speaking countries," IESE Research Papers D/655, IESE Business School.
    11. Dessein, Wouter, 2002. "Information and Control in Alliances and Ventures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. David R. Skeie, 2007. "Vesting and control in venture capital contracts," Staff Reports 297, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    13. Cumming, Douglas & Johan, Sofia Atiqah binti, 2008. "Preplanned exit strategies in venture capital," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1209-1241, October.
    14. Broughman, Brian, 2008. "Independent Directors and Board Control in Venture Finance," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9w966114, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    15. Cumming, Douglas J. & MacIntosh, Jeffrey G., 2003. "A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture capital exits," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 511-548, March.
    16. Broughman Brian, 2013. "Independent Directors and Shared Board Control in Venture Finance," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 41-72, June.
    17. Mantell, Edmund H., 2005. "An ergodic theory of venture capital solicitation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 149-168.
    18. Douglas Cumming & Grant Fleming & Armin Schwienbacher, 2008. "Financial intermediaries, ownership structure and the provision of venture capital to SMEs: evidence from Japan," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 59-92, June.
    19. Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan, 2007. "Advice and monitoring in venture finance," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 21(1), pages 3-43, March.
    20. Fried, Jesse & Broughman, Brian, 2007. "Power and Payouts in the Sale of Startups," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6sm713kb, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    21. Shih-Chung Chang, 2009. "The Role of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Financing," Finance Working Papers 22886, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    22. Tennert, Julius & Lambert, Marie & Burghof, Hans-Peter, 2017. "Moral hazard in VC finance: More expensive than you thought," Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 02-2017, University of Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences.
    23. Cumming, Douglas & Fleming, Grant & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2006. "Legality and venture capital exits," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 214-245, January.

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