IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The role of managers’ behavior in corporate fraud


  • Cohen, Jeffrey
  • Ding, Yuan
  • Lesage, Cedric


  • Stolowy, Hervé



Based on anecdotal evidence from press articles covering 39 high profile alleged or acknowledged corporate fraud cases, the objective of this paper is to examine one dimension partially unexplored: the role of managers’ behavior in the commitment of the fraud.

Suggested Citation

  • Cohen, Jeffrey & Ding, Yuan & Lesage, Cedric & Stolowy, Hervé, 2008. "The role of managers’ behavior in corporate fraud," Les Cahiers de Recherche 900, HEC Paris.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0900

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bergstresser, Daniel & Philippon, Thomas, 2006. "CEO incentives and earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 511-529, June.
    2. Denis, David J. & Hanouna, Paul & Sarin, Atulya, 2006. "Is there a dark side to incentive compensation?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 467-488, June.
    3. Alexander Dyck & Natalya Volchkova & Luigi Zingales, 2008. "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1093-1135, June.
    4. Suraj Srinivasan, 2005. "Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 291-334, May.
    5. Ajzen, Icek, 1991. "The theory of planned behavior," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 179-211, December.
    6. Efendi, Jap & Srivastava, Anup & Swanson, Edward P., 2007. "Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 667-708, September.
    7. Roger Martin, 2007. "Through the Ethics Looking Glass: Another View of the World of Auditors and Ethics," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 70(1), pages 5-14, January.
    8. Merle Erickson & Michelle Hanlon & Edward L. Maydew, 2006. "Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 113-143, March.
    9. Abernethy, Margaret A. & Vagnoni, Emidia, 2004. "Power, organization design and managerial behaviour," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 29(3-4), pages 207-225.
    10. Pincus, Karen V., 1989. "The efficacy of a red flags questionnaire for assessing the possibility of fraud," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 14(1-2), pages 153-163, January.
    11. Gregory S. Miller, 2006. "The Press as a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 1001-1033, December.
    12. Braun, Robert L., 2000. "The effect of time pressure on auditor attention to qualitative aspects of misstatements indicative of potential fraudulent financial reporting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 243-259, April.
    13. Knapp, Carol A. & Knapp, Michael C., 2001. "The effects of experience and explicit fraud risk assessment in detecting fraud with analytical procedures," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-37, January.
    14. Agrawal, Anup & Chadha, Sahiba, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 371-406, October.
    15. William R. Kinney & Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, 2004. "Auditor Independence, Non-Audit Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 561-588, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Fraud auditing standards; fraud triangle; corporate fraud; theory of planned behavior; personality traits; ethics;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0900. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Haldemann). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.