Empirical Analyses of U.S. Congressional Voting on Recent FTA Bills
This paper discusses what political and economic factors affect house representatives voting behavior on free trade agreement (FTA) implementation bills in the 108th and 109th Congresses in the U.S. using a simultaneous probit-tobit model that consists of contribution equations and voting equations. We find that partisanship, especially when the results of roll-calls have narrow margins; a relative employment size in trade-sensitive sectors; and contribution funds exert great influence on the voting behaviors of representatives. The marginal effects of political and economic variables in the study could provide some policy implications for the prediction of the passage of future FTA bills in Congress.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.eaber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Guillaume R. Frechette & John H. Kagel & Steven Lehrer, 2000. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1515, Econometric Society.
- Eugene Beaulieu & Christopher Magee, 2004. "Four Simple Tests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Policy Preferences," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 163-187, 07.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eab:govern:22992. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shiro Armstrong)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.