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Financial Crisis, Global Liquidity and Monetary Exit Strategies

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  • Ansgar Belke

Abstract

We develop a roadmap of how the ECB should further reduce the volume of money (money supply) and roll back credit easing in order to prevent inflation. The exits should be step-by-step rather than one-off. Communicating about the exit strategy must be an integral part of the exit strategy. Price stability should take precedence in all decisions. Due to vagabonding global liquidity, there is a strong case for globally coordinating monetary exit strategies. Given unsurmountable practical problems of coordinating exit with asymmetric country interests, however, the ECB should go ahead - perhaps joint with some Far Eastern economies. Coordination of monetary and fiscal exit would undermine ECB independence and is also technically out of reach within the euro area.

Suggested Citation

  • Ansgar Belke, 2010. "Financial Crisis, Global Liquidity and Monetary Exit Strategies," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 995, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp995
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    File URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.355795.de/dp995.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Belke, Ansgar & Goecke, Matthias & Guenther, Martin, 2009. "When Does It Hurt? The Exchange Rate ""Pain Threshold"" for German Exports," Ruhr Economic Papers 148, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    2. Tesfaselassie, Mewael F., 2009. "Looking forward: exiting unconventional monetary policy," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 32960, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    3. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "The Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 466-472, May.
    4. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    5. Charles Goodhart, 2009. "The Interest Rate Conditioning Assumption," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(2), pages 85-108, June.
    6. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    7. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rockett, Katharine E, 1988. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 318-340, June.
    8. Jean-Claude Trichet, 2009. "The ECB's Enhanced Credit Support," CESifo Working Paper Series 2833, CESifo Group Munich.
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    Cited by:

    1. Treu, Johannes, 2010. "Anmerkungen zur möglichen geldpolitischen Exit-Strategie der EZB," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 04/2010, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exit strategies; international policy coordination and transmission; open market operations; unorthodox monetary policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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