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Financial Crisis, Global Liquidity and Monetary Exit Strategies

  • Ansgar Belke

    ()

We develop a roadmap of how the ECB should further reduce the volume of money (money supply) and roll back credit easing in order to prevent inflation. The exits should be step-by-step rather than one-off . Communicating about the exit strategy must be an integral part of the exit strategy. Price stability should take precedence in all decisions. Due to vagabonding global liquidity, there is a strong case for globally coordinating monetary exit strategies. Given unsurmountable practical problems of coordinating exit with asymmetric country interests, however, the ECB should go ahead – perhaps joint with some Far Eastern economies. Coordination of monetary and fiscal exit would undermine ECB independence and is also technically out of reach within the euro area.

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Paper provided by Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen in its series Ruhr Economic Papers with number 0183.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rwi:repape:0183
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  1. repec:rwi:repape:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2009. "Is Monetary Policy Effective during Financial Crises?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 573-77, May.
  3. Belke, Ansgar, 2002. "Towards a Balanced Policy Mix under EMU: Co-ordination of Macroeconomic Policies and ‘Economic Government’?," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 17, pages 21-53.
  4. Belke, Ansgar & Göcke, Matthias & Guenther, Martin, 2009. "When does it hurt? The exchange rate "pain threshold" for German exports," Discussion Papers 45, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Center for international Development and Environmental Research (ZEU).
  5. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 94, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  6. Jean-Claude Trichet, 2009. "The ECB's Enhanced Credit Support," CESifo Working Paper Series 2833, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Ansgar Belke & Andreas Rees, 2009. "The Importance of Global Shocks for National Policymakers: Rising Challenges for Central Banks," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 922, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  8. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "The Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 466-72, May.
  9. Tesfaselassie, Mewael F., 2009. "Looking forward: Exiting unconventional monetary policy," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 32849, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  10. Ansgar Belke & Daniel Gros, 2005. "Is A Unified Macroeconomic Policy Necessarily Better for a Common Currency Area?," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 266/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  11. Claudio Borio & Piti Disyatat, 2009. "Unconventional monetary policies: an appraisal," BIS Working Papers 292, Bank for International Settlements.
  12. Jürgen von Hagen & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Jakob von Weizsäcker, 2009. "A European Exit Strategy," Policy Briefs 328, Bruegel.
  13. Charles Goodhart, 2009. "The Interest Rate Conditioning Assumption," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(2), pages 85-108, June.
  14. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
  15. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rockett, Katharine E, 1988. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 318-40, June.
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