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La cohérence dans la mobilisation du capital humain:une illustration de la théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle dans les banques de réseau

  • Christine Marsal

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne)

(VF)S’il est courant d’opposer capital financier et capital humain les organisations mettent en place des mécanismes de coordination afin de faire converger les intérêts des deux catégories de partenaires que sont les salariés et les actionnaires. La théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle permet de fournir un cadre d’analyse pertinent pour rendre compte de ces mécanismes. Dans ce cadre nous pouvons constater la pluralité des mécanismes d’incitation. Parmi eux, les incitations financières et le pouvoir de délégation accordé au niveau local figurent en bonne place. Ce qui garantit l’efficacité de ces mécanismes est la complémentarité et la cohérence des différentes composantes de l’architecture organisationnelle. Nous illustrons notre propos par une étude conduite dans le secteur bancaire français.(VA)If financial and human capital are commonly opposed, organization internal coordination used to align both employee and stockholder interest. Organizational architecure theory provides a conceptual framework to study thoses mecanisms. In this framework, we can notice incitative plurality mecanisms. We particularly study financial compensation and decision right allocation. Value creation comes from complemenarity between thoses mecanisms, an illustration is given in french retail banking sector.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1060501.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1060501
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Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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  1. Rebecca S. Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Agency problems and risk taking at banks," Staff Reports 29, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  2. White, William D., 1992. "Information and the control of agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 111-117, June.
  3. Gérard Charreaux, 1998. "La théorie positive de l'agence:lecture et relectures..," Working Papers CREGO 0980901, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  4. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Pour une véritable théorie de la latitude managériale et du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0960601, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  5. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  6. Rayton, Bruce A., 2003. "Firm performance and compensation structure: performance elasticities of average employee compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 333-352, June.
  7. Brickley, James A. & Zimmerman, Jerold L., 2001. "Changing incentives in a multitask environment: evidence from a top-tier business school," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 367-396, December.
  8. Rebecca S. Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Agency problems and risk taking at banks," Research Paper 9709, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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