IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Who's minding the store? motivating and monitoring hired managers at small, closely held firms: the case of commercial banks

  • Robert DeYoung
  • Kenneth Spong
  • Richard J. Sullivan

We test whether the gains from hiring an outside manager exceed the principal-agent costs of owner-manager separation at 266 small, closely held U.S. commercial banks. Our results suggest that hiring an outside manager can improve a bank's profit efficiency, but that these gains depend on aligning the hired managers with owners via managerial shareholdings. We find that over-utilizing this control mechanism results in entrenchment, while under-utilization is costly in terms of foregone profits. This study provides a relatively unfettered test of mitigating principal-agent costs, because these small banks cannot rely on market forces or blocks of outside investors to monitor managers.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/1999/wp99_17.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Working Paper Series with number WP-99-17.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-99-17
Contact details of provider: Postal:
P.O. Box 834, 230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60690-0834

Phone: 312/322-5111
Fax: 312/322-5515
Web page: http://www.chicagofed.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/print_publication_order_form.cfm Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Rebel A. Cole & Hamid Mehran, 1996. "The effect of changes in ownership structure on performance: evidence from the thrift industry," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 96-6, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  2. Chen, Carl R & Steiner, Thomas L & Whyte, Ann Marie, 1998. "Risk-Taking Behavior and Management Ownership in Depository Institutions," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 1-16, Spring.
  3. Pi, Lynn & Timme, Stephen G., 1993. "Corporate control and bank efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 515-530, April.
  4. Gorton, Gary & Rosen, Richard, 1995. " Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1377-1420, December.
  5. Allen N. Berger & John H. Leusner & John J. Mingo, 1994. "The efficiency of bank branches," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 94-26, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  6. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
  7. Kenneth Spong & Richard J. Sullivan & Robert DeYoung, 1995. "What makes a bank efficient? : a look at financial characteristics and management and ownership structure," Financial Industry Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Dec, pages 1-19.
  8. Allen N. Berger & Loretta J. Mester, 1997. "Inside the black box: what explains differences in the efficiencies of financial institutions?," Working Papers 97-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  9. Paul W. Bauer & Allen N. Berger & Gary D. Ferrier & David B. Humphrey, 1997. "Consistency conditions for regulatory analysis of financial institutions: a comparison of frontier efficiency methods," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-50, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  10. Evanoff, Douglas D & Israilevich, Philip R, 1991. "Regional Differences in Bank Efficiency and Technology," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 41-54, March.
  11. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
  12. Stephen Prowse, 1997. "Corporate Control In Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 509-527, December.
  13. A. Sinan Cebenoyan & Elizabeth S. Cooperman & Charles A. Register, 1999. "Ownership Structure, Charter Value, and Risk-Taking Behavior for Thrifts," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 28(1), Spring.
  14. Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, 1997. "Bank capitalization and cost: evidence of scale economies in risk management and signaling," Working Papers 96-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  15. Prowse, Stephen, 1997. "Corporate Control in Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 509-27, Winter.
  16. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Agency problems and risk taking at banks," Staff Reports 29, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  17. Rebecca S. Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Agency problems and risk taking at banks," Research Paper 9709, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  18. Glassman, Cynthia A & Rhoades, Stephen A, 1980. "Owner vs. Manager Control Effects on Bank Performance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(2), pages 263-70, May.
  19. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  20. Jalal D. Akhavein & Allen N. Berger & David B. Humphrey, 1996. "The Effects of Megamergers on Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-03, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  21. Jalal Akhavein & PVBA Swamy & Stephen Taubman, 1994. "A General Method of Deriving the Efficiencies of Banks from a Profit Function," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 94-26, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  22. Saunders, Anthony & Strock, Elizabeth & Travlos, Nickolaos G, 1990. " Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 643-54, June.
  23. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
  24. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
  25. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September.
  26. Pulley, Lawrence B & Braunstein, Yale M, 1992. "A Composite Cost Function for Multiproduct Firms with an Application to Economies of Scope in Banking," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(2), pages 221-30, May.
  27. Jondrow, James & Knox Lovell, C. A. & Materov, Ivan S. & Schmidt, Peter, 1982. "On the estimation of technical inefficiency in the stochastic frontier production function model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 233-238, August.
  28. DeYoung, Robert & Hasan, Iftekhar, 1998. "The performance of de novo commercial banks: A profit efficiency approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 565-587, May.
  29. Knopf, John D. & Teall, John L., 1996. "Risk-taking behavior in the U.S. thrift industry: Ownership structure and regulatory changes," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1329-1350, September.
  30. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  31. Mitchell, Karlyn & Onvural, Nur M, 1996. "Economies of Scale and Scope at Large Commercial Banks: Evidence from the Fourier Flexible Functional Form," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(2), pages 178-99, May.
  32. Alien, Linda & Cebenoyan, A. Sinan, 1991. "Bank acquisitions and ownership structure: Theory and evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 425-448, April.
  33. Schranz, Mary S, 1993. "Takeovers Improve Firm Performance: Evidence from the Banking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 299-326, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-99-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernie Flores)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.