Optimal Military Spending, Trade and Stochastic Economic Growth
In this paper, based on dynamic programming we investigate the military spending, trade and wealth accumulation in a stochastic endogenous growth model. For the Cobb-Dauglas utility function, explicit solutions of the optimal problem in the home country are obtained, and the optimal consumptions of domestic goods and foreign goods, the share of domestic capital stock and foreign bond holdings are derived. The comparative dynamic analysis shows that when intertemporal substitution in consumption is relative elastic, the lower the foreign military spending, the higher variance of foreign military spending and lower volatility in the return of capital or bonds will result in lower consumption ratio and higher economic growth rate.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://cema.cufe.edu.cn/|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pindyck, Robert S. & Solimano, Andres, 1993.
"Economic instability and aggregate investment,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1148, The World Bank.
- Robert S. Pindyck & Andres Solimano, 1993. "Economic Instability and Aggregate Investment," NBER Working Papers 4380, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pindyck, Robert S. & Solimano, Andrés., 1993. "Economic instability and aggregate investment," Working papers 3552-93., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- van der Ploeg, F & de Zeeuw, A J, 1990.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive Arms Accumulation,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 131-46, February.
- van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 1987. "Perfect equilibrium in a model of competitive arms accumulation," Research Memorandum FEW 266, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 1988. "Perfect equilibrium in a model of competitive arms accumulation," Discussion Paper 1988-4, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Deger, Saadet & Sen, Somnath, 1983. "Military expenditure, spin-off and economic development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1-2), pages 67-83.
- Abu-Bader, Suleiman & Abu-Qarn, Aamer S., 2003.
"Government expenditures, military spending and economic growth: causality evidence from Egypt, Israel, and Syria,"
Journal of Policy Modeling,
Elsevier, vol. 25(6-7), pages 567-583, September.
- Suleiman Abu-Bader & Aamer Abu-Qarn, 2003. "Government Expenditures, Military Spending and Economic Growth: Causality Evidence from Egypt, Israel and Syria," Working Papers 163, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Abu-Bader, Suleiman & Abu-Qarn, Aamer, 2003. "Government Expenditures, Military Spending and Economic Growth: Causality Evidence from Egypt, Israel and Syria," MPRA Paper 1115, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Liutang Gong & Heng-fu Zou, 2001.
"Military spending and stochastic growth,"
CEMA Working Papers
57, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
- Landau, Daniel, 1993. "The economic impact of military expenditures," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1138, The World Bank.
- Michael D. Intriligator & D. L. Brito, 1976. "Formal Models of Arms Races," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 2(1), pages 77-88, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cuf:wpaper:373. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Qiang Gao)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.