Price Competition when Product Quality is Uncertain
We consider a market where consumers differ in risk aversion. Two firms sell products of uncertain quality. We characterize the Nash equilibriura in prices and show that, due to consumers' heterogeneity, less reliable products are likely to coexist with more reliable ones in equilibrium. Moreover, choosing to increase the risk component is in some cases an equilibrium strategy.
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- Bouckaert, J.M.C. & Degryse, H.A., 1998.
"Price competition between an expert and a non-expert,"
1998-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bouckaert, Jan & Degryse, Hans, 2000. "Price competition between an expert and a non-expert," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 901-923, August.
- Bouckaert, Jan & Degryse, Hans, 1998. "Price Competition Between an Expert and a Non-Expert," CEPR Discussion Papers 1905, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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