Cartel Stability under Quality Differentiation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Marco A. Marini, 2018.
"Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets,"
Chapters,in: Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 3, pages 34-56
Edward Elgar Publishing.
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- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, October.
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- Harrington, Joseph E., 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 1-105, August.
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More about this item
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2019-01-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2019-01-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2019-01-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2019-01-14 (Industrial Organization)
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