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Identification of a Class of Adverse Selection Models with Contracts Variation

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  • Xavier d'Haultfoeuille

    (CREST)

  • Philippe Février

    (CREST)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février, 2011. "Identification of a Class of Adverse Selection Models with Contracts Variation," Working Papers 2011-27, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2011-27
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 1994. "Competition under Nonlinear Pricing," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 34, pages 13-69.
    2. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
    3. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:03 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
    5. Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2009. "Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1993-2008, November.
    6. Gaurab Aryal & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2011. "Identification of Insurance Models with Multidimensional Screening," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-538, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    7. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2002. "Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 605-629, Winter.
    8. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2009. "Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1193-1227, July.
    9. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2009. "Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00622963, HAL.
    10. Christopher Ferrall & Bruce Shearer, 1999. "Incentives and Transactions Costs Within the Firm: Estimating an Agency Model Using Payroll Records," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(2), pages 309-338.
    11. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2002. "Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 943-971.
    12. Eugenio J. Miravete & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2003. "Estimating Markups under Nonlinear Pricing Competition," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-21, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    13. Pascal Lavergne & Alban Thomas, 2005. "Semiparametric estimation and testing in a model of environmental regulation with adverse selection," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 171-192, January.
    14. Crawford, Gregory S & Shum, Matthew, 2007. "Monopoly Quality Degradation and Regulation in Cable Television," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 181-219, February.
    15. Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995. "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Papers 9504, Southern California - Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    adverse selection; nonparametric identification; fixed point; group theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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