The Provision of Wage Incentives : A Structural Estimation Using Contracts Variation
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More about this item
Keywordsincentives; asymmetric information; optimal contracts; nonparametric identification;
- C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-05-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAB-2012-05-22 (Labour Economics)
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