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Salaire minimum et emploi en presence de négociations salariales

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  • Guy Laroque

    (Crest)

  • Bernard Salanié

    (Crest)

Abstract

This paper studies the employment effects of the minimum wage when wages are negotiated at the individual level between firms and workers. Our data suggest that the Kalai-Samorodinsky solution fits the observations better than the Nash Solution. Results from estimating the model are rather disappointing, as they give no bargaining power to firms.
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Suggested Citation

  • Guy Laroque & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Salaire minimum et emploi en presence de négociations salariales," Working Papers 2002-10, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2002-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877.
    2. Zvi Eckstein & Kenneth I. Wolpin, 1995. "Duration to First Job and the Return to Schooling: Estimates from a Search-Matching Model," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 263-286.
    3. repec:adr:anecst:y:1996:i:41-42 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    5. John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David N. Margolis, 1999. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 251-334, March.
    6. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.),Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284, Elsevier.
    7. John M. Abowd & Laurence Allain, 1996. "Compensation Structure and Product Market Competition," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 41-42, pages 207-217.
    8. Guy Laroque & Bernard Salanié, 2000. "Une décomposition du non-emploi en France," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 331(1), pages 47-66.
    9. John A. Abowd & Thomas Lemieux, 1993. "The Effects of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Case of Foreign Competition in Canada," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(4), pages 983-1014.
    10. repec:adr:anecst:y:1996:i:41-42:p:09 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. l'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck & Pérez-Duarte, Sébastien, 2013. "Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 42-58.
    2. Samir AMINE, 2017. "Job complexity and wage bargaining," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(1(610), S), pages 189-196, Spring.
    3. Samir AMINE, 2017. "Job complexity and wage bargaining," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(1(610), S), pages 189-196, Spring.

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