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Recursive Methods for Computing Equilibria of General Equilibrium Dynamic Stackelberg Games

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Abstract

We extend the Hansen and Prescott (1991) method for the numerical computation of equilibria of dynamic business cycle models in which there are two sets of agents who play a dynamic Stackelberg game. Such models have application to analysis of issues of optimal government policy in which the government plays the role of Stackelberg leader and a representative private agent is the follower. We show how to derive time-consistent policy rules for the Stackelberg leader, and we consider an application of the methodology to the determination of optimal government spending in perfectly competitive growth model. Nous généralisons la méthode Hansen et Prescott (1991) pour calculer numériquement l'équilibre de modèles du cycle économique, au cas où deux groupes d'agents interagissent dans un jeu de Stackelberg dynamique. Cette généralisation trouve application dans l'analyse de politiques optimales lorsque e gouvernement est le leader et l'agent privé représentatif est le suiveur. Nous montrons comment dériver des règles de rétroaction de politique économique qui sont intertemporellement cohérentes et nous appliquons la méthodologie à la détermination du niveau optimal de dépenses publiques de consommation dans un modèle de croissance néo- classique.

Suggested Citation

  • Steve Ambler & Alain Paquet, 1994. "Recursive Methods for Computing Equilibria of General Equilibrium Dynamic Stackelberg Games," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 25, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  • Handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:25
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    1. Taylor, John B & Uhlig, Harald, 1990. "Solving Nonlinear Stochastic Growth Models: A Comparison of Alternative Solution Methods," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, January.
    2. Kydland, Finn, 1975. "Noncooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(2), pages 321-335, June.
    3. Ambler, Steve & Paquet, Alain, 1996. "Fiscal spending shocks, endogenous government spending, and real business cycles," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-3), pages 237-256.
    4. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Stanley Fischer, 1989. "Lectures on Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262022834, January.
    5. Chari, V V & Christiano, Lawrence J & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1991. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy: Some Recent Results," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(3), pages 519-539, August.
    6. Rotemberg, Julio J & Woodford, Michael, 1992. "Oligopolistic Pricing and the Effects of Aggregate Demand on Economic Activity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1153-1207, December.
    7. Ambler, Steve & Desruelle, Dominique, 1991. "Time inconsistency in time-dependent team games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-6, September.
    8. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nie, Pu-yan & Chen, Li-hua & Fukushima, Masao, 2006. "Dynamic programming approach to discrete time dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with independent and dependent followers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 169(1), pages 310-328, February.
    2. Dan Protopopescu, 2009. "Dynamic Stackelberg Game with Risk-Averse Players: Optimal Risk-Sharing under Asymmetric Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 797.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. Ambler, Steve & Paquet, Alain, 1996. "Fiscal spending shocks, endogenous government spending, and real business cycles," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-3), pages 237-256.
    4. Rodrigo Suescún M., 2000. "Optimical Commodity Price Stabilizador Over the Business Cycle," Borradores de Economia 154, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    5. Richard Dennis, 2013. "Asset Prices, Business Cycles, and Markov-Perfect Fiscal Policy when Agents are Risk-Sensitive," CAMA Working Papers 2013-69, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    6. repec:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:3:p:399-410 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Ambler, Steve & Cardia, Emanuela & Farazli, Jeannine, 1999. "Export promotion, learning by doing and growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(5-6), pages 747-772, April.
    8. Marius Jurgilas, 2007. "Monetary Policy Under a Currency Board," Working papers 2007-34, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    9. Ambler, Steve & Pelgrin, Florian, 2010. "Time-consistent control in nonlinear models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2215-2228, October.
    10. Lu, Jye-Chyi & Tsao, Yu-Chung & Charoensiriwath, Chayakrit, 2011. "Competition under manufacturer service and retail price," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1256-1264, May.
    11. Ambler, Steve, 1999. "Les modèles à agent représentatif et la politique de taxation optimale," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(4), pages 539-557, décembre.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    business cycles; dynamic games; optimal policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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