IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/7036.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Measure for Credibility: Tracking US Monetary Developments

Author

Listed:
  • Demertzis, Maria
  • Marcellino, Massimiliano
  • Viegi, Nicola

Abstract

Our objective is to identify a way of checking empirically the extent to which expectations are de-coupled from inflation, how well they might be anchored in the long run, and at what level. This methodology allows us then to identify a measure for the degree of anchorness, and as anchored expectations are associated with credibility, this will serve as a proxy for credibility. We apply this methodology to the US history of inflation since 1963 and examine how well our measure tracks the periods for which credibility is known to be either low or high. Of particular interest to the validity of the measure is the start of the Great Moderation. Following the narrative of a number of well documented incidents in this period, we check how well our measure captures both the evolution of credibility in US monetary policy, as well as reactions to inflation scares.

Suggested Citation

  • Demertzis, Maria & Marcellino, Massimiliano & Viegi, Nicola, 2008. "A Measure for Credibility: Tracking US Monetary Developments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7036
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7036
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Refet S. Gürkaynak & Andrew T. Levin & Eric T. Swanson, 2006. "Does inflation targeting anchor long-run inflation expectations? evidence from long-term bond yields in the U.S., U.K., and Sweden," Working Paper Series 2006-09, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    2. Timothy Cogley & Thomas J. Sargent, 2005. "Drift and Volatilities: Monetary Policies and Outcomes in the Post WWII U.S," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(2), pages 262-302, April.
    3. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov & Andrew K. Rose, 2007. "Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(5), pages 1163-1176, August.
    4. Norman Loayza & Raimundo Soto, 2002. "Inflation Targeting: An Overview," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Norman Loayza & Raimundo Soto & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.), Inflation Targeting: Desing, Performance, Challenges, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 1, pages 001-022 Central Bank of Chile.
    5. Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2008. "Inflation Targets as Focal Points," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 55-87, March.
    6. Johnson, David R., 2002. "The effect of inflation targeting on the behavior of expected inflation: evidence from an 11 country panel," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 1521-1538, November.
    7. Frederic S. Miskin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007. "Does Inflation Targeting Make a Difference?," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Frederic S. Miskin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edition 1, volume 11, chapter 9, pages 291-372 Central Bank of Chile.
    8. Bomfim, Antulio N & Rudebusch, Glenn D, 2000. "Opportunistic and Deliberate Disinflation under Imperfect Credibility," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 707-721, November.
    9. Marvin Goodfriend, 1993. "Interest rate policy and the inflation scare problem: 1979-1992," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Stefania Albanesi & V. V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, 2003. "Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 715-741.
    11. Lawrence J. Christiano & Christopher J. Gust, 2000. "The expectations trap hypothesis," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 21-39.
    12. Goodfriend, Marvin & King, Robert G., 2005. "The incredible Volcker disinflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(5), pages 981-1015, July.
    13. Croushore, Dean & Koot, Ronald S., 1994. "A measure of federal reserve credibility," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 215-231, April.
    14. Demertzis Maria & Viegi Nicola, 2009. "Inflation Targeting: A Framework for Communication," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-32, December.
    15. Marvin Goodfriend, 2007. "How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 47-68, Fall.
    16. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2007. "Will monetary policy become more of a science?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-44, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. Marvin Goodfriend, 2004. "Inflation Targeting in the United States?," NBER Chapters,in: The Inflation-Targeting Debate, pages 311-352 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Alex Brazier & Richard Harrison & Mervyn King & Tony Yates, 2008. "The Danger of Inflating Expectations of Macroeconomic Stability: Heuristic Switching in an Overlapping-Generations Monetary Model," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(2), pages 219-254, June.
    19. Todd E. Clark & Taisuke Nakata, 2008. "Has the behavior of inflation and long-term inflation expectations changed?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 17-50.
    20. Refet S Gürkaynak & Andrew Levin & Eric Swanson, 2010. "Does Inflation Targeting Anchor Long-Run Inflation Expectations? Evidence from the U.S., UK, and Sweden," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(6), pages 1208-1242, December.
    21. Todd E. Clark, 1999. "A comparison of the CPI and the PCE price index," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q III, pages 15-29.
    22. Frederic S. Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. "One Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?," NBER Working Papers 8397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Frederic S. Miskin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007. "Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting: An Introduction," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Frederic S. Miskin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edition 1, volume 11, chapter 1, pages 001-022 Central Bank of Chile.
    24. Andrew T. Levin & Fabio M. Natalucci & Jeremy M. Piger, 2004. "The macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 51-80.
    25. Eyal Argov & David Rose & Philippe D Karam & Natan P. Epstein & Douglas Laxton, 2007. "Endogenous Monetary Policy Credibility in a Small Macro Model of Israel," IMF Working Papers 07/207, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Timo Henckel & Gordon D. Menzies & Daniel J. Zizzo, 2013. "The Great Recession and the Two Dimensions of European Central Bank Credibility," CAMA Working Papers 2013-55, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    2. Łyziak, Tomasz & Paloviita, Maritta, 2017. "Anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area: Recent evidence based on survey data," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 52-73.
    3. Pongsak Luangaram & Yuthana Sethapramote & Chutiorn Tontivanichnon, 2015. "Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy in Thailand," PIER Discussion Papers 3., Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research, revised Sep 2015.
    4. Ana Beatriz Galvao & Massimiliano Marcellino, 2010. "Endogenous Monetary Policy Regimes and the Great Moderation," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/22, European University Institute.
    5. Martin Kliem & Alexander Kriwoluzky & Samad Sarferaz, 2016. "On the Low‐Frequency Relationship Between Public Deficits and Inflation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(3), pages 566-583, April.
    6. Scott Davis, 2012. "The Effect of Commodity Price Shocks on Underlying Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Credibility," Working Papers 272012, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    7. Łyziak, Tomasz & Paloviita, Maritta, 2017. "Formation of inflation expectations in turbulent times : Can ECB manage inflation expectations of professional forecasters?," Research Discussion Papers 13/2017, Bank of Finland.
    8. Malikane, Christopher & Mokoka, Tshepo, 2012. "Monetary policy credibility: A Phillips curve view," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 266-271.
    9. Serkan ÇİÇEK & Cüneyt AKAR & Eray YÜCEL, 2011. "Türkiye’de enflasyon beklentilerinin çapalanması ve güvenilirlik," Iktisat Isletme ve Finans, Bilgesel Yayincilik, vol. 26(304), pages 37-55.
    10. Todd E. Clark & Troy A. Davig, 2008. "An empirical assessment of the relationships among inflation and short- and long-term expectations," Research Working Paper RWP 08-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    anchors for expectations; credibility; Great Inflation; Great Moderation;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7036. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.