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Inflation Targeting - a Framework for Communication

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  • Maria Demertzis
  • Nicola Viegi

Abstract

More than a monetary policy strategy, we interpret inflation targeting as a framework for communication. We model monetary policy as an information game between the Bank and private agents. Our analysis shows how the provision of an explicit numerical inflation objective overcomes potential information imperfections by providing a focal point for agents who form expectations. Furthermore, the combination of the target and the tolerance bands around it communicated, provide a very clear framework with which to evaluate monetary policy outcomes. A successful Central Bank then builds up credibility and a credible Central Bank is in a better position to be successful in subsequent periods. We show how (and when) inflation targeting exploits this self-reinforcing loop to help the Central Bank endure large and long-lasting shocks. Last, we show that a trade-off emerges when choosing the band-width: too narrow bands provide a focal point but reduce the likelihood of inflation being successful'. Too wide bands on the other hand, lead easier to success but at the risk of failing to provide a clear focal point. We thus derive the optimal band-width for different scenarios.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2007. "Inflation Targeting - a Framework for Communication," DNB Working Papers 149, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:149
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. van der Cruijsen, Carin & Demertzis, Maria, 2011. "How anchored are inflation expectations in EMU countries?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 281-298, January.
    2. Isabelle SALLE & Marc-Alexandre SENEGAS & Murat YILDIZOGLU, 2013. "How Transparent About Its Inflation Target Should a Central Bank be? An Agent-Based Model Assessment," Cahiers du GREThA 2013-24, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
    3. Freddy H. CASTRO, 2012. "Señales de política monetaria y movimientos en la estructura a plazo de la tasa de interés en Colombia," ARCHIVOS DE ECONOMÍA 009908, DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIÓN.
    4. Naraidoo, Ruthira & Paya, Ivan, 2012. "Forecasting monetary policy rules in South Africa," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 446-455.
    5. Nautz, Dieter & Pagenhardt, Laura & Strohsal, Till, 2017. "The (de-)anchoring of inflation expectations: New evidence from the euro area," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 103-115.
    6. Rangan Gupta & Josine Uwilingiye, 2010. "Dynamic Time Inconsistency And The South African Reserve Bank," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 78(1), pages 76-88, March.
    7. Maria Demertzis & Massimiliano Marcellino & Nicola Viegi, 2009. "Anchors for Inflation Expectations," DNB Working Papers 229, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    8. Yigit, Taner M., 2010. "Inflation targeting: An indirect approach to assess the direct impact," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1357-1368, November.
    9. Salle, Isabelle & Yıldızoğlu, Murat & Sénégas, Marc-Alexandre, 2013. "Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 114-128.
    10. Gabriele Galati & John Lewis & Steven Poelhekke & Chen Zhou, 2011. "Have market views on the sustainability of fiscal burdens influenced monetary authorities' credibility?," DNB Working Papers 304, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    11. Demertzis, Maria & Marcellino, Massimiliano & Viegi, Nicola, 2008. "A Measure for Credibility: Tracking US Monetary Developments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Andersson, Fredrik N. G. & Jonung, Lars, 2017. "How Tolerant Should Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Be? Selecting the Proper Tolerance Band - Lessons from Sweden," Working Papers 2017:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    13. Yakov Ben-Haim & Maria Demertzis, 2008. "Confidence in Monetary Policy," DNB Working Papers 192, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    14. Cheick Kader M'baye, 2012. "Inflation Targeting under Heterogeneous Information and Sticky Prices," Working Papers 1202, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    15. Salle, Isabelle L., 2015. "Modeling expectations in agent-based models — An application to central bank's communication and monetary policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 130-141.
    16. Mayes, David G. & Paloviita, Maritta & Virén, Matti, 2016. "EMU and the Anchoring of Inflation Expectations," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 69(4), pages 341-364.
    17. Mayes David & Paloviita Maritta & Viren Matti, 2015. "The EMU and the anchoring of inflation expectations?," Discussion Papers 103, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    18. Cheick Kader M'Baye, 2012. "Inflation Targeting under Heterogeneous Information and Sticky Prices," Working Papers halshs-00677671, HAL.
    19. Luba Petersen, 2014. "Forecast Error Information and Heterogeneous Expectations in Learning-to-Forecast Experiments," Discussion Papers dp14-05, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy; Communication; Focal Points; Credibility; Optimal Band-Width.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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