IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Overconfidence and Delegated Portfolio Management


  • Palomino, Frédéric
  • Sadrieh, Abdolkarim


Following extensive empirical evidence about ‘market anomalies’ and overconfidence, the analysis of financial markets with agents overconfident about the precision of their private information has received a lot of attention. All these models consider agents trading for their own account. In this article, we analyse a standard delegated portfolio management problem between a financial institution and a money manager who may be of two types: rational or overconfident. We consider several situations. In each case, we derive the optimal contract and results on the performance of financial institution hiring overconfident managers relative to institutions hiring rational agents, and results on the price impact of overconfidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Palomino, Frédéric & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2004. "Overconfidence and Delegated Portfolio Management," CEPR Discussion Papers 4231, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4231

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Palomino, Frederic & Prat, Andrea, 2003. " Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 113-137, Spring.
    2. Palomino, Frederic, 1996. " Noise Trading in Small Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1537-1550, September.
    3. Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1997. "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1024-1050, October.
    4. Gervais, Simon & Odean, Terrance, 2001. "Learning to be Overconfident," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
    5. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-738, August.
    6. Peter Diamond, 1998. "Managerial Incentives: On the Near Linearity of Optimal Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 931-957, October.
    7. Anders Ekholm & Daniel Pasternack, 2008. "Overconfidence and Investor Size," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(1), pages 82-98.
    8. Terrance Odean, 1998. "Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(6), pages 1887-1934, December.
    9. Kent D. Daniel, 2001. "Overconfidence, Arbitrage, and Equilibrium Asset Pricing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 921-965, June.
    10. Alexander Puetz & Stefan Ruenzi, 2011. "Overconfidence Among Professional Investors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(5-6), pages 684-712, June.
    11. Heath, Chip & Tversky, Amos, 1991. "Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-28, January.
    12. Terrance Odean, 1999. "Do Investors Trade Too Much?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1279-1298, December.
    13. Benos, Alexandros V., 1998. "Aggressiveness and survival of overconfident traders," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 353-383, September.
    14. Easley, David & O'Hara, Maureen, 1987. "Price, trade size, and information in securities markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 69-90, September.
    15. Cohen, Randolph B. & Gompers, Paul A. & Vuolteenaho, Tuomo, 2002. "Who underreacts to cash-flow news? evidence from trading between individuals and institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 409-462.
    16. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1985. "Delegated portfolio management," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, June.
    17. Susan I. Cohen & Laura T. Starks, 1988. "Estimation Risk and Incentive Contracts for Portfolio Managers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(9), pages 1067-1079, September.
    18. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1997. "Does It All Add Up? Benchmarks and the Compensation of Active Portfolio Managers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(3), pages 323-350, July.
    19. Caballe, Jordi & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2003. "Speculating against an overconfident market," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 199-225, April.
    20. Wang, F. Albert, 2001. "Overconfidence, Investor Sentiment, and Evolution," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 138-170, April.
    21. Hackbarth, Dirk, 2008. "Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(04), pages 843-881, December.
    22. Kyle, Albert S & Wang, F Albert, 1997. " Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 2073-2090, December.
    23. Stoughton, Neal M, 1993. " Moral Hazard and the Portfolio Management Problem," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 2009-2028, December.
    24. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, 2002. "Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(2), pages 455-488, March.
    25. KENT D. DANIEL & David Hirshleifer & AVANIDHAR SUBRAHMANYAM, 2004. "A Theory of Overconfidence, Self-Attribution, and Security Market Under- and Over-reactions," Finance 0412006, EconWPA.
    26. Albert Wang, F., 1998. "Strategic trading, asymmetric information and heterogeneous prior beliefs," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 321-352, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Neubert, Milena & Bannier, Christina E., 2016. "Actual and perceived financial sophistication and wealth accumulation: The role of education and gender," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145593, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. repec:spt:apfiba:v:8:y:2018:i:3:f:8_3_5 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Wang, Jian & Sheng, Jiliang & Yang, Jun, 2013. "Optimism bias and incentive contracts in portfolio delegation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 493-499.
    4. repec:pal:jintbs:v:48:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1057_s41267-016-0058-4 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    optimal contract; overconfidence; risk-taking incentives;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4231. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.