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Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate Environmental Performance

  • Earnhart, Dietrich
  • Lizal, Lubomir

This Paper analyses the effects of ownership structure on corporate environmental performance and examines the link from financial performance to environmental performance in a transition economy. In particular, it analyses these ownership effects and this performance link using an unbalanced panel of Czech firms for the years 1993 to 1998. It considers state ownership and various types of private ownership, while contrasting concentrated and diffuse forms of private ownership. Additionally, it examines whether or not successful financial performance begets or undermines good environmental performance.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3557.

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Date of creation: Sep 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3557
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  1. Lubomír Lízal, 2002. "Determinants of Financial Distress: What Drives Bankruptcy in a Transition Economy? The Czech Republic Case," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 451, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  2. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. Jan Svejnar & Evzen Kocenda, 2002. "The Effects of Ownership Forms and Concentration on Firm Performance after Large-Scale Privatization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 471, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  4. Konar, Shameek & Cohen, Mark A., 1997. "Information As Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 109-124, January.
  5. Earnhart, Dietrich, 2000. "Liability for Past Environmental Contamination and Privatization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2571, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. repec:oup:qjecon:v:114:y:1999:i:4:p:1153-1191 is not listed on IDEAS
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  8. Djankov, Simeon, 1999. "Ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly independent states," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2047, The World Bank.
  9. Lubomir Lizal & Jan Svejnar, 2000. "Financial Conditions and Investment during the Transition: Evidence from Czech Firms," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp153, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  10. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  12. Lubomír Lízal & Jan Svejnar, 2002. "Investment, Credit Rationing, And The Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence From Czech Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 353-370, May.
  13. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon, 1999. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic," CEPR Discussion Papers 2145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
  15. Patrick BOLTON & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1996. "Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9619, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  16. Judson, Ruth A. & Owen, Ann L., 1999. "Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide for macroeconomists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-15, October.
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  19. Nandini Gupta & John C. Ham & Jan Svejnar, 2000. "Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 323, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  20. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, 2001. "Does The Market Value Environmental Performance?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(2), pages 281-289, May.
  21. Dietrich Earnhart, 2000. "Optimal Mix Of Penalties In A Principal-Agent Model Under Different Institutional Arrangements," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(4), pages 634-645, November.
  22. Maurice J.G. Bun & Sarafidis, V., 2013. "Dynamic Panel Data Models," UvA-Econometrics Working Papers 13-01, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Dept. of Econometrics.
  23. Robert D. Klassen & Curtis P. McLaughlin, 1996. "The Impact of Environmental Management on Firm Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(8), pages 1199-1214, August.
  24. Earnhart, Dietrich, 1997. "Enforcement of Environmental Protection Laws under Communism and Democracy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 377-402, October.
  25. Nickell, Stephen J, 1981. "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1417-26, November.
  26. Arora Seema & Cason Timothy N., 1995. "An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 271-286, May.
  27. repec:oup:restud:v:58:y:1991:i:2:p:277-97 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, 1996. "Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 72(4), pages 413-432.
  29. Khanna, Madhu & Quimio, Wilma Rose H. & Bojilova, Dora, 1998. "Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 243-266, November.
  30. Furubotn, Eirik G & Pejovich, Svetozar, 1972. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 1137-62, December.
  31. J.C. Bosch & E. Woodrow Eckard & Insup Lee, 1998. "EPA enforcement, firm response strategies, and stockholder wealth: an empirical examination," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(3), pages 167-177.
  32. Kiviet, Jan F., 1995. "On bias, inconsistency, and efficiency of various estimators in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 53-78, July.
  33. Khanna, Madhu & Damon, Lisa A., 1999. "EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic Performance of Firms," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-25, January.
  34. Harris, M.N. & Matyas, L., 1996. "A Comparative Analysis of Different Estimatiors for Dynamic Panel data Models," Monash Econometrics and Business Statistics Working Papers 4/96, Monash University, Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics.
  35. Magat, Wesley A & Viscusi, W Kip, 1990. "Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 331-60, October.
  36. Evžen Kočenda, 1999. "Residual State Property in the Czech Republic," Eastern European Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 37(5), pages 6-35, October.
  37. Keane, Michael P & Runkle, David E, 1992. "On the Estimation of Panel-Data Models with Serial Correlation When Instruments Are Not Strictly Exogenous," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 10(1), pages 1-9, January.
  38. Earnhart, Dietrich, 2000. "Environmental Crime and Punishment in the Czech Republic: Penalties against Firms and Employees," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 379-399, June.
  39. Dietrich Earnhart, 2000. "Liability for Past Environmental Contamination and Privatization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 302, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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